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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates empirically the determinants of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) into countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The 
empirical analysis of this thesis conducted at three different levels, intra-regional 
level, country-level and firm-level. Chapter five investigates FDI determinants 
between MENA countries using a gravity model with fixed effects included in the 
model. The results indicate that traditional gravity factors play important roles in 
explaining the level of FDI between MENA countries. The effects of geographical 
distance, common borders and bilateral investment treaties are particularly relevant 
to FDI within the region, suggesting that bilateral FDI flows tend to be larger 
between neighbours, having already established bilateral investment treaties 
agreements. The results also show that FDI inflows differ between MENA 
countries according to their economic and institutional structure. Resource-rich 
countries on average receive less FDI compared resource-poor countries in the 
region. Furthermore, FDI to resource-poor countries found to responds negatively 
to the availability of natural resource, and positively to the quality of institutions, 
opposite to the case of the resource-rich countries. 
Chapter six investigates the determinants of FDI into MENA and developing 
countries. The empirical analysis of this chapter aimed to answer the question of 
whether determinants of FDI in developing countries affect MENA countries 
differently. The results indicate that a MENA country receive on average 1.21 
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percent less FDI than a non-MENA country, and  that the natural resources have a 
direct negative effect on FDI to MENA countries even after controlling for the 
necessary factors for both MENA and developing countries. The marginal effects of 
return on investment, quality of infrastructure and macroeconomic instability on 
FDI were found to be less for a MENA country compared to a non-MENA country. 
The results also show that qualities of institutions in MENA countries are 
negatively affected by the presence of natural resource in these countries (resource 
curse effects).  Unlike other developing countries, the interaction between natural 
resource and institutions in MENA region found to have adverse effect on FDI. 
Chapter seven investigates the effect of FDI and business environment constraints 
on the performance of firms in three MENA countries, Egypt, Morocco and Turkey 
using firm-level data. The results indicate that foreign ownership has positive 
significant impact on performance of firms in the three selected MENA countries. 
The results also show that performance of firms in the three MENA countries 
hindered by the constraints of business environments in these countries. Education 
of labor, access to finance, electricity outages obstacles and corruption were all 
found to have negative effects on the growth and performance of firms. The results 
also indicate that performance of firms differ across countries and industries. A 
comparison in term of firms’ performance indicate that on average, textiles and 
garments firms in Egypt have less comparative advantage in their productivity per 
worker than firms in Turkey and Morocco. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Research Aims and Objectives 
 
FDI inflows to MENA, as well as to other developing countries, considered to be 
very important and play a vital role in the development of these countries.  FDI 
allow for the transfer of technology, provides for financial capital needs, enhance 
the productivity of domestic firms and, more importantly, generate opportunities of 
jobs for unemployment. Unfortunately, MENA countries have not been successful 
in reaping the benefits of FDI as much as other developing countries and the region 
still lagging behind many other developing countries in term of economic 
development. With a total population of more than 400 million and a high level of 
unemployment ranging between 10 and 25 per cent in 2010(O’Sullivan et al. 2011), 
MENA countries are in desperate need of more FDI inflows to resolve their 
economic problems. The last events of the Arab Spring have brought to light many 
of these economic problems that have already existed in the region for decades.   
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These economic problems include high level of unemployment; persistent 
corruption and lack of accountability and transparency; bloated public sectors with 
state-owned enterprises that crowd out the development of private enterprise and 
investment; low number of enterprise creation; and, for a number of countries, a 
high dependence on fuel and food imports, (O’Sullivan et al. 2011). The flow of 
FDI to the MENA region can play an important role in resolving these economic 
problems by providing opportunities for jobs and also by providing financial capital 
for creating businesses. FDI can also contributes to the development of the region 
through technology, knowledge and skills spill-over effects; they can also enhance 
the productivity of local firms that lack many of these advantages, thus making 
them internationally more competitive. However, attracting FDI to the MENA 
region is no easy task and it depends on a number of macro and micro determining 
factors relating to type of investment, its purpose, and the economic sector targeted. 
The main objective of this research is to investigate empirically what factors 
determine FDI to MENA countries with especial emphasis on the role played by the 
availability of natural resource and quality of institutions in these countries. In 
order to find an answer for this general question, we conduct several empirical 
analyses at different levels (intra-regional, regional and firm-level) to see what 
factors are the most important for the flow of FDI to MENA countries at each level. 
The specific aims of these empirical analyses can be summarised as follows: 
 
1) To investigate the determinants of bilateral FDI between MENA countries. 
Intra -MENA FDI represents nearly one third of total FDI from the World 
to region, (Chauvin 2013). Therefore, the question of what determines these 
flows is worth investigating. Also, because the MENA region is 
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geographically and culturally linked, examining this question in the context 
of the gravity model can provide an answer to the question of whether 
geographical and culture factors play important roles in explaining the level 
of intraregional FDI between MENA countries. The empirical analysis also 
aims to investigate the question of whether there are differences in the 
determinants of intra-MENA FDI inflows to the resource-rich and resource-
poor countries. The MENA region comprises a set of countries that are 
economically diverse; some of these countries are resource poor and labour 
abundant (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen), while the others 
are resource-rich and labour-importing (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). We therefore expect FDI 
determinants for each group of countries to be different.  
 
2) To investigate the question of whether factors that affect FDI in developing 
countries affect countries in MENA region differently. Total FDI inflows to 
MENA and developing countries have increased in the last two decades; 
however, the share of FDI received by MENA countries is less than that 
share received by other developing countries in Asia and Latin America. 
MENA countries are in need of more FDI inflows as much as in developing 
countries to resolve their economic problems. Therefore, the question of 
what factors determine the flows of FDI to MENA compared to developing 
countries needs to be investigated. In the literature on FDI determinants to 
MENA countries, there are two empirical studies that have investigated this 
question, namely Onyeiwu (2003) and Mohamed and Sidiropoulos (2010). 
However, the results from these studies are mixed about what makes 
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developing countries different in their attraction to FDI than MENA 
countries. Also, none of these studies have taken into account the difference 
in the economic and institutional structure between MENA countries. The 
aim of our study in this regard is to go beyond their analysis and provide 
new evidence about the role played by the availability of natural resource 
and quality of institutions on FDI to MENA region. 
 
3) To investigate the effects of FDI and business environment constraints on 
the performance of firms in MENA countries using firm-level across 
countries comparable data provided by the World Bank. To the best of our 
knowledge, the Business Enterprise survey dataset has not been used in any 
empirical analysis looking at the main constraints on firm’s performance in 
the MENA region. Empirical evidence on the literature of firm-level FDI 
and performance of firms in MENA region is very limited. Examine this 
relationship in the context of MENA countries can enhance our 
understanding about what factors matter most for foreign investors to invest 
in the region.   More specifically, the aim of this analyse is to find answers 
for the three following questions: 1) What is the effect of FDI on the 
performance of firms in MENA countries? 2) What are the business 
environment constraints that determine the performance of firms in MENA 
countries? 3) Is there any differences in the performance of firms across 
countries and industries? 
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1.2. Research Motives 
 
The research is mainly motivated by the scarcity of empirical studies on FDI 
determinants in MENA region.  With regard to the previous empirical studies 
concern MENA region, there were only a limited number of studies that have 
investigated FDI determinants in MENA region at intra-regional and firm-levels. 
This scarcity in the number of studies is mainly attributed to the lack of FDI data 
available on MENA countries at both bilateral and firm-level. However, in recent 
years, data on MENA countries become available for researchers and easily 
accessible through websites.  The Arab Investment & Export Credit Guarantee 
Corporation is a joint-Arab agency encompassing all Arab countries and it provides 
bilateral FDI data between MENA countries. Therefore, one of the motives for 
carrying out such an empirical analysis is to make use of this unique bilateral FDI 
data available on MENA countries and find answers to our question about what 
factors determine intra-MENA FDI.   
 
Likewise, empirical studies at firm-level on MENA countries are very scant. Atyias 
(2011) provides a review to the empirical studies that have used firm-level data on 
MENA to provide some thoughts on what sort of research questions would be 
fruitful and what sort of data can be used to address them. The author pointed out 
that there is an expanding literature measuring the impact of the business 
environment on firm performance using World Bank Enterprise Survey. However, 
such studies have not been carried out in the context of the MENA region.  
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1.3. Research Methods of Analysis 
 
The empirical analyses of this thesis required an application of different 
econometric methods, due to the nature of the available data on MENA countries 
and according to the aims of the research. For instance, in chapter five, we use a 
panel gravity model estimated by ordinary least square (OLS) and probit estimation 
to overcome the problem of missing FDI data, as well as to provide comparative 
results as a robustness check for the validity of our results. Also, we used dummy 
variables as a way of implementing fixed effect to take into account the effects of 
time-invariant variables, such as physical distance and common borders and 
language. Matyas (1997) use importer and exporter dummies in addition to the time 
dummy in a gravity model to address the issue of unobservable heterogeneity of 
country pairs. In chapter six, we use a pooled OLS with time and country fixed 
effects to capture the dynamic effect of the data over time. Also, we use interaction 
terms between the explanatory variables to investigate the difference in FDI 
determinants between MENA and developing countries. The use of interaction 
terms between is very useful in our analysis as it helps to identify the differences in 
the determinants of FDI inflows to MENA in comparison to developing countries. 
Finally, in chapter seven, we use dummy variables to control for the effect of firm 
size and also to assess for the differences in performance of firms across countries 
and industries.  
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1.4. Structure of the Thesis  
 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter one provides a review to the 
economic and institutional performance of MENA countries, discussion about the 
links between FDI, natural resource and Dutch disease effects and the benefits and 
costs of FDI to the host country in general. Chapter two provides a review of the 
development of FDI theories and highlights their contribution to the overall 
understanding of FDI phenomenon. Chapter three provides a review of the 
empirical literature on FDI determinants at country and firm level, with special 
emphasis on MENA and developing countries. Chapter four provides a review of 
the theoretical development and empirical applications of the gravity model in trade 
and investment. Chapter five investigates empirically the determinants of intra-
MENA FDI using a basic and augmented gravity model. Chapter six investigates 
the determinants of FDI to MENA countries in comparison to developing countries. 
Chapter seven investigates empirically the effect of firm-level FDI and business 
environment constraints on the performance of firms in three MENA countries, 
Egypt, Morocco and Turkey. Finally, chapter eight presents the research summary 
of the empirical findings, contribution, policy implications, limitations and further 
area of research.   
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1.5. MENA Economic and Institutional Outlook 
MENA region comprise a set of Middle Eastern and North African countries that 
are economically divers. Table 1.1 presents the MENA economic performance 
indicators over the period 1996-2011. As can be seen from this table, there is 
important differences in the economic structure of MENA countries. GDP per 
capita between the MENA countries varies considerably, from Qatar having the 
highest per capita income of 46598 US$ to Sudan with the lowest per capita income 
of 719 US$. In term of population size, Egypt, Iran and Turkey are the countries 
with the largest populations among MENA countries. In term of economic size, the 
GDP of Turkey is the largest among MENA countries, while the GDP of Bahrain is 
the smallest accounting only for less than 1% of the total MENA countries’ 
economic size. The net of FDI inflows as percentage of GDP is the highest in 
Jordan, Lebanon, Bahrain, Sudan and it’s the lowest in Kuwait, Yemen, Iran and 
Syria. High inflation represents a major challenge for resource-poor countries 
which import significant amounts of food and fuel and do not have the financial 
resources of resource-rich countries in region. The rate of inflation as measured by 
the percentage change in the consumer price is the highest in Turkey, Sudan, Iran 
and it’s the lowest in Bahrain, Morocco, Libya and Saudi Arabia. 
 Table 1.2 show the estimated score of quality of institutions for MENA countries 
(calculated as average over the period 1996-2011) in six dimensions: 1) voice and 
accountability; 2) political stability and absence of violence; 3) government 
effectiveness; 4) regulatory quality; 5) rule of law and; 6) control of corruption. The 
six governance indicators are measured into units ranging from about -2,5 to 2,5, 
with higher values corresponding to better governance.  
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Table1.1. MENA economies outlook, Averages 1996 - 2011 
country 
Net FDI 
Inflow 
(% GDP) 
Net FDI 
Outflow 
(% GDP) 
GDP 
(Billions 
US$) 
GDP 
per 
Capita 
(US$) 
Inflation 
(% CPI) 
Population 
(Millions) 
Fuel & Ores 
(% Exports) 
Algeria 1.25 0.23 96 2782 4.54 33 97 
Bahrain 6.79 3.28 15 15962 1.10 0.9 82 
Egypt 2.82 0.43 120 1655 7.22 70 46 
Jordan 8.12 0.18 18 2577 3.83 5.2 16 
Iran 0.88 - 210 3024 16.74 69 81 
Kuwait 0.23 6.29 73 30066 3.18 2.2 92 
Lebanon 7.24 2.90 23 6113 2.59 3.7 10 
Libya 1.25 2.96 42 7580 1.85 5.5 96 
Morocco 1.66 0.49 59 1928 1.77 30 13 
Oman 1.98 0.73 32 12645 3.11 2.4 82 
Qatar 3.56 3.47 53 46598 4.46 0.9 86 
Saudi Arabia 2.52 0.33 310 12698 1.98 23 89 
Sudan 6.55 - 29 719 20.91 31 63 
Syria 0.90 - 23 1307 3.99 18 61 
Tunisia 3.06 - 31 3092 3.35 9.9 13 
Turkey 1.37 0.26 420 6240 35.37 66 6 
UAE 2.38 - 170 36350 3.89 4.6 80 
Yemen 0.29 0.23 16 787 11.38 19 94 
Source: Online World Bank Development Indicators database (2014). 
 
Table1.2. MENA World Governance Indicators, Averages 1996-2011 
Country VA GE PS RQ RL CC INSTIT 
Algeria -1.09 -0.68 -1.47 -0.74 -0.85 -0.68 -0.92 
Bahrain -0.89 0.51 -0.17 0.70 0.47 0.33 0.16 
Egypt -0.99 -0.31 -0.55 -0.32 -0.05 -0.44 -0.44 
Jordan -0.54 0.13 -0.28 0.25 0.33 0.13 0.00 
Iran -1.22 -0.51 -0.93 -1.54 -0.75 -0.60 -0.93 
Kuwait -0.38 0.06 0.31 0.15 0.59 0.70 0.24 
Lebanon -0.41 -0.22 -1.09 -0.22 -0.41 -0.59 -0.49 
Libya -1.73 -1.04 -0.14 -1.52 -0.92 -0.93 -1.04 
Morocco -0.58 -0.10 -0.31 -0.15 -0.03 -0.10 -0.21 
Oman -0.82 0.40 0.84 0.37 0.58 0.43 0.30 
Qatar -0.62 0.55 0.95 0.24 0.59 0.81 0.42 
Saudi Arabia -1.59 -0.22 -0.23 -0.01 0.15 -0.28 -0.36 
Sudan -1.72 -1.22 -2.26 -1.33 -1.45 -1.17 -1.52 
Syria -1.58 -0.86 -0.37 -1.15 -0.48 -0.84 -0.88 
Tunisia -0.90 0.45 0.12 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.06 
Turkey -0.26 0.09 -0.93 0.28 0.01 -0.21 -0.17 
UAE -0.75 0.81 0.85 0.68 0.57 0.70 0.48 
Yemen -1.03 -0.85 -1.61 -0.67 -1.24 -0.85 -1.04 
MENA -0.95 -0.17 -0.40 -0.28 -0.16 -0.20 -0.36 
Note: Values in this table are averages of Voice and Accountability (VA), Government Effectiveness  
(GE), Political stability (PS) Regulatory quality (RQ), Rule of law (RL) and Control of corruption (CC) 
for the period from 1996 to 2011.The overall institutional index (INSTIT) is calculated as the average 
values of the six world governance indicators. 
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As can be seen from table 2.1, the average score on quality of institutions in MENA 
region over the period 1996-2011 is below zero (-0.36) indicating that MENA 
overall performance in term of quality of institutions is very weak. The table also 
shows that, at country level, performance of MENA countries is heterogeneous, 
especially among the resource-rich countries.  Some of the resource-rich countries 
such as Sudan, Libya, Yemen, Iran and Algeria perform poorly when compared to 
the other MENA countries in general. Other MENA resource-rich countries such as 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain are countries 
where institutions best performed. The performance of MENA resource-poor 
countries is also poor but in general (as group of countries), it’s not worse than the 
performance of resource-rich countries. 
 
1.6. Natural Resources and Groups of MENA Countries  
One of the most important defining characteristics among MENA countries is the 
availability of natural resources. Some of MENA countries are endowed with 
natural resources (oil and gas in particular) while the other are not. These 
differences in the economic structural characteristics between MENA countries are 
expected to affect the diversity and performance of their economies. Therefore, it’s 
important to distinguish between the two groups of countries. 
In this research, we differentiate between the two distinct groups according to their 
natural resource export intensity (see table 1.1). Resource-poor countries comprise 
of countries where the share of the sum of minerals and oil in total merchandise 
exports (averaged over the period 1996-2011) are less than 50%. These countries 
are Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey.  Resource-rich 
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countries consist of countries where the share of the sum of minerals and oil in total 
merchandise exports is more than 50%. These countries are Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, 
Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Sudan, UAE and Yemen.  
 
1.7. FDI, Natural Resource and Dutch Disease Effect 
In the economic literature, the Dutch disease (also named as resource curse in the 
long term) refers to the adverse effects of a natural resource boom on the 
manufacturing or other tradable sectors (see Corden and Neary 1982). Accordingly, 
the increase in revenue from the investments in natural resources will make a 
country’s exchange rate higher compared to that of other countries (natural resource 
booming effects). Since the boom causes the domestic price level to increase, 
producers of tradable goods face higher production costs, which cause them to 
reduce their output. This makes exports in tradable sectors less competitive on 
world markets, and results in a loss of output and employment in other sectors 
(notably manufacturing).   
The term "Dutch disease" originate from an economic crisis in the Netherland in the 
1960s that caused by the findings of vast resource of gas in the North Sea. This new 
discovery of wealth cause inequality in the growth and development of economic 
sectors and make exports in manufacturing sectors less competitive on the world 
market.  Another example of the same economic condition happened in the UK in 
the 1970s when the price of oil raised in the world market and it became 
economically more viable to invest in the oil extraction industry.  At that time, the 
 24 
 
exchange rate of the pound became higher against other currencies and the UK had 
become a net exporter of oil after it had previously been a net importer.    
Before the 1980s, it was widely believed that natural resource abundance would 
enable developing countries to make the transition from underdevelopment to 
industrial stage, alike as it had done for countries such as Australia and the United 
States. However, this view now stands confronted by a number of studies (e.g. 
Corden and Neary 1982; Poelhekke and van der Ploeg 2010) that show the 
existence of a slower growth and poorer economic performance in natural resource 
rich countries. Recent studies suggest another explanation of the resource curse, 
that is, an abundance of natural resources leads to poorer governance and conflicts. 
It gives rise to governments that are less accountable to the people, have little 
incentive for institution upgrading, and fail to implement growth enhancing 
reforms. Higher corruption, more civil conflict, and erosion of social capital are 
some of the outcomes associated with this problem.  
Understanding the FDI and natural resource relationship is important especially for 
MENA countries, many of which rely on exports of primary commodities. The 
lessons to be learned for policy-making are particularly valuable where the 
development of manufacturing sectors is necessary for economic growth and 
development. Table 1.3 presents statistics about the change in the economic 
structure of MENA countries during the period 2000-2010. As can be seen from 
this table, the effect of resource curse on the performance of MENA resource-rich 
countries is noticeable. Most of MENA oil-exporting countries such as Algeria, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, UAE and Yemen have no 
export diversifications and still heavily depend on oil revenues and their 
manufacturing industry in decline or even not exist for some countries. In contrast, 
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MENA resource-poor countries have been successful in increasing the share of 
manufacturing exports in their total export. For instance, in some resource-poor 
countries such as Egypt, Morocco and Syria, the share of manufacturing exports 
have considerably increased while their shares of oil exports have declined over the 
same period. 
 
Table1.3. Change in the structure of exports of MENA countries 2000-2010 
Indicators 
Merchandise 
Exports 
 (Millions  US$) 
Food 
(% Of total) 
Agricultural 
raw materials 
(% Of total) 
 
Fuels 
(% Of total) 
Ores and 
Metals 
(% Of total) 
Manufactures 
(% Of total) 
Country 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 
Algeria 22,031 57,053 0 1 0 0 97 97 0 0 2 2 
Bahrain 6,195 13,647 1 7 0 0 0 0 16 70 10 22 
Egypt 5,276 26,438 8 17 5 3 42 30 4 6 38 43 
Jordan 1,899 7,028 16 17 0 0 0 1 15 9 69 74 
Iraq 20,603 52,800 1 0 0 0 97 99 0 0 0 0 
Kuwait 19,436 67,014 0 0 0 0 94 93 0 0 4 6 
Lebanon 715 5,021 20 15 2 1 0 0 7 11 71 64 
Libya 13,380 47,400 1 - 0 - 93 - 0 - 7 - 
Morocco 7,432 17,579 21 19 2 2 4 1 9 12 64 66 
Oman 11,319 36,601 4 3 0 0 83 81 1 3 12 12 
Qatar 11,594 62,000 0 0 0 0 91 73 0 0 9 5 
Saudi Arabia 77,583 249,700 1 1 0 0 92 87 0 0 7 11 
Sudan 1,807 11,443 17 6 5 1 69 92 0 0 8 0 
Syria 4,634 13,500 9 22 5 1 76 39 1 4 8 33 
Tunisia 5,850 16,427 9 8 1 1 12 14 2 2 77 76 
Turkey 27,775  113,981 13 11 1 0 1 4 3 4 81 79 
UAE 49,835 220,000 1 1 0 0 94 65 3 1 2 4 
Yemen 4,079 8,700 2 6 0 0 97 92 0 0 0 2 
Source: World Development Indicators (2012, p. 226-228) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26 
 
1.8. Benefits and Costs of FDI to the Host Countries 
FDI can bring with it many benefits and costs to the host countries and therefore, 
there is no straightforward answer to the question of the value of FDI to the host 
countries. However, especially for developing countries, it can be said that the 
benefits and cost of FDI differ from one country to another depending on several 
factors related to the host country’s business environment conditions (political, 
economic and social conditions). Charles and Hill (2006, p.246-249) provide a 
review to the main benefits and costs of FDI to Nation- State. Accordingly, the 
main benefits of FDI for a host country arise from resource-transfer effects, 
employment effects, balance-of-payments effects, and effects on competition and 
economic growth. The main costs of FDI for a host country arise from possible 
adverse effects on competition within the host nation, adverse effects on the 
balance of payments, and the perceived loss of national sovereignty and autonomy. 
In the next section, we summarise the benefits and cost of FDI to the host countries 
according to their review as follows: 
 
1.8.1. Benefits of FDI to the Host Country: 
 
• FDI can contribute positively to the economic growth of the host country by 
providing financial capital that is not available for the host country’s economy. 
Many of the multinational firms in regard to their large size and strong financial 
position usually have access to financial resources not available to host-country 
firms.  
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•  FDI can be a way of technology transfer and can contribute positively to the 
economic development and human capital of the host county. Economic literature 
identifies technology transfers as perhaps the most important channel through 
which foreign corporate presence may produce positive externalities in the host 
developing economy. Many developing countries lack the innovation skills 
required to develop their own product and process technology. 
 
•  FDI can have positive direct and indirect effects on employment in the host 
country. Direct effects occur when a foreign firm hires a number of host-country 
residents. The indirect effects arise when jobs are created in local suppliers as a 
result of the investment (intra-industry activities) and when jobs are created 
because of increased local spending by employees of the foreign firm.   
 
• FDI can enhance the host country’s balance of payment in two ways. Firstly, by 
adding more financial capital to current account in which it can be used for 
domestic investment purposes. Secondly, by producing locally, FDI can serve the 
demand in the local market and substitute for the imports of goods and services. 
 
 
 
1.8.2. Costs of FDI to the Host Country: 
 
• FDI can have a direct adverse effect on the productivity and competitiveness of the 
local firms. Many of the developing countries that aim to attract FDI may be 
discouraged by the possible “crowding out” effect of their local firms. Since that 
foreign firms possess some technology superior to that of host country firms, there 
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is worry that domestic firms may not be able to compete at lower prices.  Another 
possible negative effect is the difference in wages paid by foreign and domestic 
firms. Foreign firms may able to hire the best workers in the industry by paying 
higher wages, leaving only the low quality of workers at the domestic firms. These 
spillover negative effects are likely to be much concern in developing countries that 
have few large firms of their own, but not for industrialised countries. Unlike 
domestic firms, foreign firms that are part of large multinational organisation may 
be able to compensate (draw on funds generated elsewhere) for its costs in the host 
market. This, as result, may push local firms out of the market and allow the 
foreign firm to monopolize the market and raise prices above rival domestic firms.   
 
• FDI can also have negative effects on a host country's balance of payments. There 
are two possible adverse effects of FDI on the balance of payment of the host 
country. First, the repatriated profits from the foreign subsidiary to its parent firm. 
As consequence, repatriated profits in foreign currency most result in greater 
balance of payments outflows than a similar project financed locally. A second 
concern arises when foreign firms import large number of their inputs from abroad, 
which results in a deficit in the current account of the host country’s balance of 
payments. 
 
• Another possible disadvantage of FDI to the host country is the loss of national 
sovereignty and autonomy. Some developing countries may not allow for FDI 
because of the fear of losing economic independence. The greediness of some giant 
multinational companies has harmed the stability of many political regimes in 
developing countries and their involvement has triggered many of the regional 
conflicts in these countries.   
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Chapter 2 
 
Main Theories of FDI 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we provide a review to the development of FDI theories and outline 
their contribution to our understanding of FDI phenomenon. The review commences 
with Stephen Hymer’s seminal contribution to FDI theories and shows how other FDI 
theories were derived from his work. The chapter also reviews the classic FDI theories 
that give FDI its unique features as a process not only of transfer of capital, but also a 
transfer of the firm specific advantages such as technology and skills. The chapter also 
provides a review of the eclectic paradigm, (Dunning 1976) and how it links these 
classic FDI theories in one theoretical framework. Finally the chapter extend the 
review and discuss the contribution of Dunning (1993) and how he distinguishes 
between the different types of FDI according to their motivation to resource-seeking 
FDI, market-seeking FDI, efficiency-seeking FDI and strategic-seeking FDI. 
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2.2. Industrial Organisation Theory, (Hymer 1960) 
Since the introduction of Stephen Hymer's contribution and industrial organisation 
theory, economists have tried to find key answers that can lead them to understand 
the motives of local companies to extend their production internationally. In regard 
to the earlier attempts that aimed to explain the post-war FDI phenomenon, the 
contribution of Hymer's thesis underlies the foundations to most theoretical 
attempts that aim to provide a better understanding of multinational production 
activities. In fact, the theory itself incorporates in its assumptions the origin of those 
theories that adopted the concept of market structure failure in their interpretation 
of the existence of the Multinational Enterprises (MNEs). 
Hymer assumes that a firm's decision to invest abroad is a strategy to capitalise on 
certain capabilities not shared by other competitors in foreign countries 
(monopolistic advantages). This imperfection might occur in, firstly, goods markets 
such as product differentiation, brand names, special marketing skills or collusion 
in pricing. Secondly, it might be in factor markets such as special managerial skills, 
differences in access to capital markets and technology protected by patents. 
Thirdly, market failure can be reflected in the existence of internal or external 
economies of scale. Finally, market imperfection can be a result of government 
policies such as taxes, tariffs, interest rates, exchange rates, (Hood and Young 
1979).  
Dunning and Rugman (1985) assessed the work of Hymer and his interpretation of 
the existence of MNEs and market imperfection hypothesis. Accordingly, Hymer’s 
work failed to differentiate between two types of market failure. The structural type 
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(Bain 1956),1 originates from the firm's ownership advantages that work as entry 
barriers for other competitors in the industry (monopolistic power), and the 
transactional type (Williamson 1975), which originate naturally (exogenous to the 
MNEs). The response of MNEs to the latter is to internalise the market and transact 
efficiently at a lower cost, (Dunning 1981). Cantwell (2000) argues that Hymer 
discusses the assumption behind why and how firms invest abroad; however, he 
does not focus on how firms can operate efficiently in foreign countries, including 
their use of advantages. Casson (1987) pointed out that Hymer failed to relate his 
theory of market imperfection to Coase's (1937) theory of the firm. In this view, 
Casson (1987) states that Hymer's work failed to realise the essence of the 
transaction cost theory to differentiate between the two types of market failure. 
Although Hymer’s work is ‘seminal’ for the further development of the 
International Business scholarship, it is not short of criticism. The most important 
one is the heavy focus on the Bain-type market imperfections and the relatively 
superficial treatment of transaction costs-related market imperfections based on the 
seminal work of Coase (1937) and later further developed by Williamson (1975). 
This criticism was a major debate in international scholarship. Dunning and 
Rugman (1985, p229) state that “Hymer’s dissertation is remarkably prescient in 
its identification of structural market failure, but that it somewhat overlooks the 
transaction-cost side of the literature’’. The authors support the view that Hymer’ 
work fails to distinguish between the market failure-types of the specific 
advantages of MNEs.  
Kindleberger (1969) extended the earlier work of the industrial organisation 
hypothesis by expressing the fact that those monopolistic advantages must be firm-
                                                          
1For more details see Bain, J. S. (1956), Barriers to new competition. 
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specific and transferable within the firm's subsidiaries. He states that “for direct 
investment to thrive there must be some imperfection in markets for goods or 
factors, including among the latter technology, or some interference in competition 
by government or by firms, which separates markets”, (Kindleberger 1969, p 13).   
Knickerbocker’s (1973) oligopolistic reaction theory interprets international 
production behaviour as a strategic reaction to the rival companies within the 
industry. In this view, multinational enterprises tend to follow the industry's leaders 
(the giant companies of the industry) in their moves to exploiting new markets as a 
defensive strategy in the long term. The reaction behaviour of the competitors can 
not only be in exploiting a new market; it can also be in acquiring competitive 
assets as a strategic policy of keeping their position in the industry.  
Aliber (1970) explains the FDI phenomenon as a consequence of market 
imperfection in the financial market. Accordingly, capital flows as a consequence 
of the exchange rate change risk from countries with a stronger currency position as 
opposed to those with a weaker one. This would give foreign firms an advantage 
over local firms to capitalise their investment returns at a higher rate as a result of 
their ability to borrow at a lower rate from the international capital market. Critics 
of this theory argue that, although this view is compatible with the early post-war 
American dollar domination, it has no interpretation for the rise of Europe and 
Japanese MNEs. 
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2.3. Product Life Cycle Theory, (Vernon 1966) 
The theory of Product Life Cycle (PLC) tries to explain the establishment of 
operations in a foreign country by integrating the theory of comparative costs 
(essentially the concept of comparative advantage) with the time and the location of 
the innovation of a new product; also, how the further stages of the production life 
cycle, maturity and standardisation affect the location choice of the MNEs.  In this 
respect, PLC gave to the international business scholarship a dynamic location 
aspect, which was absent in the work of Hymer (1960). 
It is important to note that, in the period in which the PLC was developed, the US 
was by far the country with the highest per capita income in the world and its 
production structure was characterised by high unit labour costs. The PLC theory, 
then, was limited to products that were targeting high-income consumers, or were 
covering a labour-saving need. The rationale for the choice of such products is the 
timing and the location of the innovation of such products in the US. This would 
happen, according to Vernon (1966), because innovation is inter alia a function of 
effective communication between the potential market and the potential suppliers, 
which is conditioned in Vernon’s analysis by geographic proximity (national 
boundaries). Taking these into consideration, the PLC theory is characterised by the 
following stages: 
 
• Stage 1: New Product  
At the first stage, the product is targeting mainly the market of the home country, 
where the appropriate demand conditions exist. The product is still unstandardised 
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in terms of its final specification, which favours the establishment of the production 
facility in the home market, even if this will be comparatively disadvantaged over 
foreign locations. This is because of two reasons, which are related in the new and 
unstandardised nature of the product. The fact that the product is new makes cost 
considerations to be of relatively less importance in the production facility location 
decision of an individual firm, as it enjoys a first-mover advantage. The 
unstandardised nature of the product and the resulting frequent changes in the 
inputs makes effective communication (geographic proximity) of the manufacturer 
with other market participants (such as customers and suppliers) essential. During 
this stage, some demand from other high income foreign countries, as predicted by 
the Linder (1961) hypothesis, may occur, but this will be satisfied by exports. 
• Stage 2: Maturing Product 
At this stage, an increase in the demand for the product and an increasing 
standardisation of the product, at least in terms of its general specifications, have 
important location implications. This is because of the initial importance of 
geographic proximity, due to the need of the producing firm for flexibility and swift 
communication with participants in the national market, is declining in importance, 
while cost considerations as a result of the declining uncertainty of the production 
operations gain more attention in comparison with Stage 1. The initial response of 
the firm at this phase is usually relocation from the industrial core of the home 
country to the lower-cost location in the periphery.  The increase in demand, 
however, in other developed countries would cause the firm to consider setting up 
local production facilities in these countries.  The decision-making process for 
setting up a facility abroad is complex; it includes not only comparative cost 
considerations, but also the level of the indigenous competition, patent protection, 
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as well as policy (tariff levels) and institutional (political situation) considerations. 
Once a production facility is established in a foreign developed country and given 
full exploitation of economies of scale, then cost considerations (mainly labour 
costs) increase in importance. In case the new production facility abroad offers a 
cost advantage in comparison with that in the home country, then exports to third 
countries may be substituted with exports from this new facility. In case 
transportation costs can be off-set by (labour) cost differences, the MNEs may 
substitute production in the home country with imports from abroad.   
 
• Stage 3: Standardised Product 
At this advanced stage of the product life cycle, all its characteristics are fully 
standardised and competition is based mostly on the price considerations (high 
price elasticity of demand). The possibility of setting up a facility in less developed 
countries is increasing, according to other product characteristics and the nature of 
the value-add activities for its production.  These include, except the level of labour 
input needed and price elasticity of demand, the need for the inputs or the services 
of related industries (repair services, for example); plus, if the product is of high 
value, that would make it possible to absorb the high transportation costs from 
exporting from geographically remote less developed countries. During this stage, 
imports in the home country from developed countries will be substituted with 
imports from less developed countries.  
With the PLC theory, Vernon (1966) devised a dynamic location feature, which 
explains the patterns of the internalisation of production in two ways: 
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• The hierarchy of economies is relevant in explaining international 
investment. The introduction and production of new products occurs in high-
income countries (the U.S in the 50s and 60s); eventually, via FDI, they 
spread to the rest of the world in a hierarchical way, first to other developed 
countries and then to less developed countries. 
 
• Not only is there a hierarchy in the location patterns of the 
internationalisation of the production, but Vernon (1966) implicitly provides 
a hierarchy of the strategic motives for FDI. First, FDI happens because of 
demand (market-seeking considerations) in developed countries; then, in the 
maturing stage of the PLC, cost considerations become more important and 
rationalisation of the production in other than the home country happens 
because of efficiency-seeking motivations. 
 In the standardised stage of the PLC, there is a maximisation of the cost 
considerations; production moves to less developed countries clearly because of 
efficiency-seeking motivations, as the local market is relatively small. In addition to 
the introduction of the dynamic location and motivation feature in the theory of the 
internalisation of production, the PLC theory provided some insight into the source 
(innovation capacity) of the rise of the firm-specific advantages that enable a firm 
to become MNEs, an issue that was ignored by Hymer. Vernon (1966), however, in 
contrast with Hymer, did not proceed explicitly in an analysis of market 
imperfections, (Dunning and Lundan 2008). 
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 Although the PLC theory offered the aforementioned useful insights in explaining 
the internationalisation of production, it is a theory that reflects the specific time 
period of the 50s and 60s and is quite ethnocentric as it focuses only on US MNEs.  
The focus in this specific time period and the US reflects the horizontal orientation 
of the US MNEs, where innovation was a result of efforts in the home country, 
while foreign subsidiaries were concentrated in the manufacturing process. 
Subsequent changes in the world economy as a result of increasing levels of 
globalisation and an increase in the sources of technological innovation make the 
PLC theory less relevant, (Cantwell 1995). Subsidiaries are no longer just a replica 
of the manufacturing units of the home country; instead, because of technological 
and market heterogeneity, they are actively involved in the innovation efforts of the 
MNEs by tapping into the technology pool of the host countries. They are, 
therefore, engaged in the development of new products that reflect local/regional 
market tastes, (Papanastassiou and Pearce 1999). 
 
2.4. Internalisation Theory, (Buckley and Casson 1976) 
The internalisation approach sought to explain the internalisation of production and 
the existence of the MNEs through a transaction cost theoretical framework based 
on the seminal work of Coase (1937). The main hypothesis of this theory is that the 
MNEs come into existence when a firm internalises operations across national 
borders in order to overcome transaction cost-related failures in the market for 
intermediate products. The internalisation theory was established by Buckley and 
Casson (1976) in their seminal work “The Future of the Multinational Enterprise’’. 
While earlier approaches to the international business scholarship such as Hymer 
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(1960) and Vernon (1966) sought to analyse the internationalisation of production 
as a separate issue from the existence of the firm, Buckley and Casson (1976) saw 
the question of the existence of the MNEs as a derivative of the question of the 
existence of the firm in general: “The solution to an intellectual problem – in this 
case explaining the international expansion of a firm - is sometimes best achieved 
not by breaking down the problem into a set of smaller issues, but rather by raising 
the level of generality and subsuming the problem under a wider issue – in this 
case, the rationale for the firm itself,’’ (Buckley and Casson 2009, p1570).  
Coase (1937) sought to explain the existence and the size of a firm by analysing 
how the choice is made between the alternatives of allocating resources by using 
the price mechanism as against internalising transactions within the firm: “In view 
of the fact that while economists treat the price mechanism as a co-ordinating 
instrument, they also admit the co-ordinating function of the ‘entrepreneur’, it is 
surely important to enquire why co-ordination is the work of the price mechanism 
in one case and of the entrepreneur in another.’’ Given the assumption that the 
most cost-effective one out of these two alternatives is more desirable in each 
transaction, a firm would choose to internalise such transactions as long as the 
marginal internalisation cost of each additional transaction is lower than the cost of 
using the price mechanism. The costs involved in using the price mechanism are 
related to the discovery of relative prices, the costs of negotiating a contract for 
each transaction and the costs arising by uncertainty in the case of long-term 
contracts.  The marginal costs of internalisation, though, are increasing with each 
additional internalised transaction (that is, they are increasing as the size of the firm 
is increasing). This is because a bigger firm faces higher organisation costs, 
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increased possibility of misallocation of resources and a potential increase in the 
supply price of production factors, (Coase 1937). 
Buckley and Casson (1976) developed the internalisation theory by building on 
Coase (1937) and simply viewing the MNEs as a special case of a firm that has 
internalised (by owning and controlling) operations across national borders.  The 
internalisation theory of the MNEs, as developed by Buckley and Casson (1976), 
rests on three principles (Buckley and Casson 2009): 
• The boundaries of a firm are set at the margin, where the benefits of further 
internalisation of markets are just offset by the costs. 
• Firms seek out the least cost location for each activity, taking its linkages with 
other activities into account. 
• The firm’s profitability, and the dynamics of its growth, is based on a continued 
process of innovation stemming from R&D. 
Internalisation occurs because of market failure in the intermediate product 
markets.  Market failure in the intermediate input markets lead to a vertical 
integrated MNEs (vertical FDI), while market failures in the intermediate output 
markets lead to the horizontally integrated MNEs (horizontal FDI), (Caves 1996; 
Buckley and Casson 2009).  
Restricting the first general preposition to individual cases of these different 
failures in the market of intermediate products, Buckley and Casson (1976) 
identified several industries in which internalisation is very likely to happen. These 
industries, according to Casson (1982), are R&D intensive industries, natural 
resources-seeking industries and industries where government interventions 
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encourage transfer pricing. The main focus of Buckley and Casson (1976), 
however, is the special case of forward integration from R&D to production. This 
reflects the view of the scholars in that the most important intermediate product for 
a firm is knowledge which, as an intangible good, has been ignored in most of the 
neoclassical theories, (Buckley and Casson 2009). They asserted that the benefits of 
internalising knowledge are substantial as the market for knowledge is inhibited by 
market failures, such as asymmetric information and buyer uncertainty. In this way, 
Buckley and Casson (1976) distinguished knowledge internalisation from 
operational internalisation. The latter reflected gains from internalising 
intermediate products moving to different stages of production, while the former 
reflected the gains from internalising knowledge produced by R&D efforts, 
(Buckely and Casson 2009). 
 However, the determinants of the geographic distribution of the production, which 
is of primary importance for explaining FDI, cannot be explained by the 
internalisation without using location theory.  The second preposition of the 
internalisation approach states that a firm would choose the least cost location to 
internalise its operations. It is important to note that the first and the second 
preposition are interdependent, as choice of internalisation is a comparative cost 
(benefit) analysis between the cost (benefit) of internalising across national borders 
and the costs (benefits) of servicing a foreign market by other means (exporting or 
licensing). Location elements, then, such as transport costs, communication costs, 
government intervention, economies of scale, relative differences in the availability 
of non-tradable products, political risk and others are important in estimating the 
costs and benefits of internalisation ,(Buckley 1988).  
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The relative importance of these factors, however, is determined by the industry 
and the specific business activity that the MNEs are considering to internalise, 
(Buckley and Casson 2009). For example, FDI in primary metals extraction will 
place relatively more emphasis on the availability of these natural resources in a 
country rather than on the local standards of living. The third preposition, that the 
firm’s profitability along with the dynamics of its growth (and so the growth of its 
multi-nationality) will be based on a continued process of innovation, puts into 
context the view of the internalisation approach about the firm-specific advantages. 
These are that, according to early approaches to international business, such as 
Hymer (1960), they enable a firm to compete in a foreign market by overcoming 
the disadvantage of operating in a different political and economic environment 
than in the firm’s home country.  
According to the internalisation approach, such a firm-specific advantage is not a 
necessary condition for a firm to engage in FDI. This is because, according to 
Buckley (1988), in a dynamic context the act of internalising a market represents a 
strategic move to increase profitability, which places a firm at an advantage in 
relation to its competitors. The most important criticisms of the internalisation 
theory are related to (1) the preposition that firm-specific advantages are not 
relevant in explaining the internationalisation of production; and (2) the 
microeconomic nature of the approach, which results in an examination of FDI 
mainly through the lenses of the MNEs, while the locational aspects of the host 
countries are not analysed in an appropriate level of detail. 
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2.5. International Production Theory, (Dunning 1976) 
The eclectic paradigm theory introduced by John Dunning in 1976 was in fact, an 
analytical framework that sought to find the interdependency between the earlier 
theoretical attempts of international production. The three components of the OLI2 
model, introduced as a coherent framework, help economists to explain and 
understand the behaviour of MNEs investing abroad. The essence of the OLI 
paradigm originates from its capability to encompass the main important factors 
that influence the MNEs decision to be internationally engaged in value added 
activities. Accordingly, there are three conditions that must be satisfied in order for 
firms to engage in FDI.  
First, a firm should possess comparative advantages, or an ownership advantages 
factor (O) over competitive firms, which arise from their possession of some 
intangible assets, such as property rights of a particular technology, firm size and 
monopoly power, access to raw material or cheap finance. Second, it must be 
beneficial for the firm to exploit these advantages internally, Internalisation factor 
(I), rather than to sell or licence them to other firms. Thirdly, it must be more 
beneficial for the firm to combine those advantages with some input factors abroad, 
location factor (L); otherwise, exporting will be more appropriate, (Imad A. Moosa 
2002).  
The ownership advantages (O) provide an answer to the question of why some 
firms extend their production internationally. The concept of ownership advantages 
was an important tenet in Dunning’s OLI model, since it draws the line with other 
                                                          
2 OLI stands for “ownership”, “location” and “internalisation”, which are the three types of advantages 
perceived by the eclectic framework as necessary for the generation of FDI. 
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international production theories. Dunning asserts that the monopolistic ownership 
advantage, as represented by Hymer, is a necessary factor which gives a firm its 
unique characteristic. However, it is not sufficient to explain why firms would 
expand their production internationally when other ways of serving the foreign 
markets, such as export or licensing, can be applied (see Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1. The eclectic approach, (Dunning 1981) 
Advantages 
Entry Form 
Ownership 
Advantages (O) 
Internalisation 
Advantage (I) 
Location Advantages 
(L) 
Licensing Yes No No 
Export Yes Yes No 
FDI Yes Yes Yes 
Source: Dunning (1981) 
  
Dunning (1988) decomposes the ownership advantages into two types of 
advantages, namely asset ownership advantages (Oa) and transaction ownership 
advantages (Ot).  The Oa advantages are those that originate from the possession of 
the firm to particular intangible assets (property rights). The Ot advantage is that 
those kinds of advantages originate from the firm’s hierarchical organisation 
structures in internalising intermediate products (common governance), especially 
knowledge, in the face of transactional market failure (Hennart 1982; Rugman 
1980). 
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The Internalisation advantages (I) provide an answer to the question as to how 
market transactions can be done efficiently without any other additional costs. 
Accordingly, foreign firms acquire their ownership advantages from their ability to 
keep control over their organisational dispersion across borders. In order for firms 
to transact efficiently at a lower cost, they mostly exploit these advantages 
internally. The location advantages (L) provide an answer to the question of where 
firms choose to locate their production. Accordingly, firms need to combine their 
ownership advantages with a set of location factors. These factors include trade 
barriers, host government policies, relative market costs and the size of the market. 
However, there are many criticisms to the model, as John Dunning himself said. 
The model is criticised as being too general and has limited powers to explain only 
specific modes of international production, (Dunning 1988). Also, Kojima (1978) 
criticises the eclectic model as being too micro (business-oriented) and claims it is 
of limited use for policy formation by home or host countries. Vernon (1985) 
claimed that the model is static and not able to explain the change in the process of 
international production.  Dunning (1988) asserts that, after a decade from its 
inception, the eclectic paradigm is still a useful and powerful general framework, 
not only for analysing and explaining the economics of international production, 
but is also a useful tool for many organisational issues related to MNEs activities.  
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2.6. FDI Motives, (Dunning 1993) 
Dunning (1993) categorises multinational enterprise activities according to their 
motives into four types of FDI: (1) Resource Seeking FDI, (2) Market Seeking FDI, 
(3) Efficiency Seeking FDI and (4) Strategic Assets Seeking FDI.3 
1.  Resource Seeking FDI:  This type of FDI is motivated by the opportunity to 
take advantage of particular abundant natural resources at a lower cost than could 
be obtained in their home country. Dunning (1993) classified resource-seeking FDI 
into three types of FDI. First, those looking for abundant physical natural resources 
such as fossil fuels, metals, industrial minerals, and agriculture products. Second, 
those undertaken by manufacturing and services firms from developed countries 
into developing countries in order to take advantage of low labour costs. Third, 
those undertaken by firms who seek to take advantage of technological capability, 
management or marketing expertise and organisational skills.  
2. Market Seeking FDI: This type of FDI undertaken by firms that invests in a 
particular country or region for the purpose of serving the markets in that country or 
region.  There are four main factors that encourage firms to engage in such types of 
FDI. The first factor is that their main suppliers have set foreign subsidiaries; as a 
result, they follow the suppliers' actions to maintain their business. The second 
reason is that the products need to be adapted to the taste and the culture needs of 
the local markets. The third reason is that serving the market from foreign 
subsidiaries can enable the firm to avoid high transaction costs of serving the 
markets from a distance. The fourth, and most important, reason is that setting up 
foreign production subsidiaries is part of global production and marketing strategy 
                                                          
3 See Dunning and Lundan (2008) for a detailed review. 
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for the firm in order to have a physical presence with its rivals in the leading 
markets (defensive action). 
3. Efficiency Seeking FDI: This type of FDI is undertaken by firms that operate in 
multi foreign locations in order to take advantage of the differences in factor 
endowment, institutional arrangements, demand pattern, economic policies and 
market structures across the boundaries.  The main aims of efficiency-seeking FDI 
are to gain from the division of the market activities by rationalising the structure of 
existing based resource or market-seeking investments. Most efficiency-seeking 
FDI are characterised by being a risk-diversified investment and are promoted by 
the integration between markets.  
4. Strategic Assets Seeking FDI: This type of FDI is motivated by the opportunity 
to sustain or promote their global competitiveness position by purchasing assets or 
shares of existing companies for long-term strategic objectives. Another possible 
explanation of strategic asset-seeking FDI is that foreign firms tend to weaken other 
competitors in the market by buying their assets in order to strength their own 
Ownership specific advantages. FDI strategic investments are most important for 
companies who aim to take such investment as a future strategy for restructuring 
their investments, or to diversify their investments. 
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2.7. Conclusion 
There are several theories that have been put forward by the economists to explain 
FDI, but no single theory have been successful in explain the real motivations 
behind the different type of FDI. However, it can be said that most of these theories 
in some way or another sought to answer three fundamental questions: (1) why 
some firms but not others go abroad? (2) where MNEs chooses to locate their 
investment? (3) how MNEs chooses to operate in a foreign country? Dunning's OLI 
model has brought together these differing theories into a broadly recognised 
paradigm in which to investigate the determinants of FDI location. One feature of 
the model is that it allows for a variety of factors to be tested, depending on 
whether the focus is on ownership, location or internalization advantage. This thesis 
focus on the location aspect of OLI model according to which multinational firm 
invest in a foreign country in order to acquire advantages based on location.   
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides empirical review of the factors that have been identified in 
the literature on FDI as main determinants. The chapter starts with a brief review of 
Dunning (1993) definitions of FDI motives followed by discussion of the recent 
studies that have been inspired by the latest development in the form of 
international economy and its implications for the location of FDI and MNEs 
activities. The chapter also provides a review of the main FDI determinant factors 
that have been often identified in the literature as an important location 
determinants, these factors are: the market size, infrastructure, openness to trade, 
macroeconomic instability, natural resources and the quality of institutions. In the 
final section, the review extended to includes studies that used firm-level FDI to 
investigate the effects of market and firm characteristic factors on the performance 
of firms in the host country. 
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3.2. Review of the Location Determinants of FDI  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Dunning (1993) defines three main types of 
FDI based on the motive behind the investment. Market-seeking FDI is that type of 
investment which aims to serve local markets by replicating their production 
facilities in the host country (horizontal FDI). Trade restrictions policies are to play 
important roles in a market-seeking FDI decision. For instance, imposing excessive 
restrictions on trade activities might encourage the foreign company to create 
subsidies in the host country in order to avoid high transaction costs (Tariff-
Jumping FDI). Resource-seeking FDI is that type of investment which aims to take 
advantage of abundant production factors in the host countries. The availability of 
cheap labour and abundant natural resources such as oil and gas can be the only 
reason that motivates a foreign company to invest abroad. An efficiency-seeking 
FDI is that type of investment that takes advantages of economies of specialisation 
by locating its production chain activities in different locations in order to achieve 
the lowest cost of production (vertical FDI). Strategic-seeking FDI is that type of 
investment that takes advantages of access to advanced technologies and high skills 
and developed production capabilities. For instance, a good example of this type of 
FDI is the recent high profile acquisitions of Chinese car companies, such as the 
acquisitions of MG Rover by Chinese Nanjing Automobile Group Corporation. 
In recent years, there have been many empirical studies that have investigated the 
location determinants of FDI inspired by the earlier contribution of the OLI model 
and its latest development. Dunning (1998) tried to trace back to the changing 
scenario in the international business and its implications for the location of FDI 
and MNEs activities over the past two decades. In his article ‘’Location and the 
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Multinational Enterprise: A Neglected Factor?’’, he mentioned that ‘’many of the 
explanations of the 1970s and early 1980s need to be modified as firm-specific 
assets have become mobile across natural Boundaries’’. Dunning (2000) suggests 
that ‘’dynamising’’ the OLI model and widening it to embrace asset-augmenting 
FDI and MNEs activity may still claim to be the dominant paradigm explaining the 
extent and pattern of the foreign value-added activities of firms in a globalising, 
knowledge-intensive and alliance-based market economy.  
Dunning (2009) mentioned that the unfolding events of the 1990s and the changing 
geography of FDI were demanding a careful reassessment of the location (L) 
component of the OLI paradigm. The foremost challenge of this was the emergence 
and growth of asset-augmenting or competence-seeking MNEs activities, where it 
is predicated that firms will engage in FDI, or in cross-border alliances, not to 
exploit a particular set of O-specific advantages, but to access or acquire new ones. 
Nunnenkamp (2002) argues that there is a gap in the literature between 
globalisation-induced changes in international competition for FDI and recent 
empirical evidence on the relative importance of determinants of FDI in developing 
countries. The study demonstrates that traditional market-related determinants are 
still dominant factors in developing countries. Among non-traditional FDI 
determinants, only the availability of local skills has gained importance. The study 
also found that the tariff-jumping motive for FDI had lost much of its relevance 
well before globalisation became a more important issue. World Investment Report 
(1998) provides a valuable review to the main FDI determinants that can explain 
the differences in FDI inflows between countries and to determine why firms invest 
where they do. Accordingly, the principal determinants of the location of FDI are 
the policy framework, business facilitation measures and economic factors (see 
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table 3.1). The relative importance of different location-specific FDI determinants 
depends on the motive and type of investment, the industry in question, and the size 
and strategy of the investor. Different motives, for example, can translate into 
different location patterns depending on the investor’s strategy. 
Table 3.1. Host countries determinants of FDI, (WIR 1998) 
 
Source: World Investment Report (1998), trend and determinants 
 
The main enabling framework for FDI consists of rules and regulations controlling 
entry and operations of foreign investors, standards of treatment of foreign affiliates 
and the functioning of markets. Complementing main FDI policies are other 
policies that affect foreign investors’ locational decisions and the effectiveness of 
FDI policies. These include trade policy and privatization policy. Principal FDI 
policies are important because FDI will simply not take place where it is forbidden. 
However, changes in FDI policies have an asymmetric impact on the location of 
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FDI: changes in the direction of greater openness may allow firms to establish 
themselves in a particular location, but they do not guarantee this. In contrast, 
changes in the direction of less openness, especially if radical (e.g. 
nationalizations), will pretty much ensure a reduction in FDI, (WIR 1998). 
In the literature on FDI, there are various studies that have looked similarly to the 
possible effects of these factors on FDI.  However, empirical evidence on FD 
determinants still seems to be mixed and there is no consensus among these studies 
about the signs and magnitudes of these effects on FDI. The following section 
provides a review to the empirical literature on FDI determinants in developing 
countries with especial emphasis on the locational determinants of FDI  that have 
been frequently tested in the previous empirical studies and their effects were found 
to be important for FDI. 
 
3.2.1. Market Size 
The size of the host country’s market is traditionally considered to be one of the 
most important determinant factors, especially for market-seeking FDI. A larger 
market is a sign of greater demand for goods and services and, therefore, makes the 
host country more attractive for FDI. The importance of market size has been 
confirmed in many previous empirical studies, and the relationship between FDI 
and market size has proved to be positive and conclusive in most of these studies 
(e.g. Agarwal 1980; Wheeler and Mody 1992; Tsai 1994; Singh and Jun 1995; 
Hisarciklilar et al. 2006; Mottaleb et.al 2010).  
 
 53 
 
Chakrabarti (2001) argue that the lack of a consensus over the conclusions reached 
by the wide range of empirical studies as to the relative importance and the 
direction of impact of the potential determinants of FDI can be explained, to some 
extent, in terms of the wide differences in perspectives, methodologies, sample-
selection and analytical tools. He uses Extreme Bound Analysis to examine if any 
of the conclusions from the existing studies is robust to small changes in the 
conditioning information set. The Extreme Bound Analysis upholds the robustness 
of the correlation between FDI and market-size, as measured by per-capita GDP, 
but indicates that the relation between FDI and many of the controversial variables 
(tax, wage, openness, exchange rate, tariff, growth, and trade) are highly sensitive 
to small alterations in the conditioning information set. The author also studies the 
distribution of the estimated coefficients of the controversial explanatory variables 
to rank them in order of their likelihood of their being correlated with FDI. 
 
Also, Mottaleb and Kalirajan (2010) investigate the determinants of FDI in 
developing countries based in the question of why some countries are successful in 
attracting FDI while others are not. The research results indicate that countries with 
larger GDP and high GDP growth rate, higher proportion of international trade and 
a business-friendly environment are more successful in attracting FDI. Hussain and 
Kimuli (2012) explore different factors responsible for variation in FDI to 
developing countries using a panel data of 57 low and lower middle income 
countries during the period between 2000 and 2009. This study found that market 
size is the most important determinant of foreign direct investment to developing 
countries. The role of market size has also been examined frequently in the context 
of gravity models (e.g. Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2007; Horstmann and Markusen 1992; 
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Brainard 1993; Helpman and Krugman 1985). The gravity model initially was 
developed to explain international trade and then was also applied to FDI. The 
general consensus accordingly is that FDI between two countries is positively 
driven by both countries’ economic size and negatively deterred by the 
geographical distance between them.  
 
3.2.2. Infrastructure 
The availability of better quality infrastructure in the host country is considered to 
be vital for the chain of production as it facilitates the process of supply and 
distribution of production factors. Foreign investors prefer to locate their 
investment in countries that have a well-developed physical infrastructure such as 
net reliable telecommunications (e.g. telephones, internet and mobile phones), a 
power supply, paved roads, railways, and sea and air ports. A poor quality 
infrastructure, however, increases the cost of doing business abroad and, as a result, 
reduces the rate of return on investment. Wheeler and Mody (1992) find that 
infrastructure quality is an important variable for developing countries seeking to 
attract FDI from the United States, but is less important for developed countries that 
already have high quality infrastructure. Cheng and Kwan (2000) examine FDI 
locational determinants in in 29 Chinese regions from 1985 to 1995 and find that 
the density of roads in 29 Chinese regions has positive effects on FDI flows.  
There are many indicators that have been used in the literature as proxies to 
measure the quality of infrastructure in the host country, such as roads and railway 
total network in km, air transport, freight in million ton-km, internet users, fixed 
lines and mobile phone subscribers per 100 people, etc. However, regarding the fact 
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that these indicators are highly correlated, none of them adequately capture the 
overall availability of infrastructure. For example, a country may have good-quality 
transportation, but poor-quality telecommunication. Asiedu (2002) mentioned that 
the number of telephones per 1,000 inhabitants is a standard measurement in the 
literature for infrastructure development; however, it falls short, because it only 
captures the availability and not the reliability of the infrastructure. The data 
collected from country-specific sources are always subject to reliability and 
comparability issues. These inconsistencies arise from a number of factors, 
including differences in classifications, definitions, and coverage across countries.    
Empirical studies that have investigated the effect of infrastructure on FDI inflows 
to MENA region are very few. This is mainly due to data on infrastructure that are 
mostly not available for MENA countries. One important empirical study is that 
conducted by Onyeiwu (2003) who examined the FDI determinants in MENA 
region in comparison to other developing countries. The study concludes that 
infrastructure has no significant impact on the inflows of FDI to MENA countries. 
The author argue that these insignificant impact can be explained by the fact that 
much of the FDI flows to MENA countries goes into natural-resource exploitation–
sectors in which telephone lines (the proxy for infrastructure) are not important. 
Likewise, Mohamed and Sidiropoulos (2010) also examine FDI determinants in 
MENA countries and reach same conclusion. 
 
3.2.3. Openness to Trade 
The relationship between the host country’s openness to trade and FDI inflows 
depends mainly on the motives of FDI in the host country. For example, in market-
seeking FDI, the aim of the foreign firm is to serve the local market. Therefore, 
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higher restrictions on trade activities would promote the foreign firm to set up 
subsidies in order to reduce the cost of trade restrictions and tariff-jumping FDI. 
While in efficiency or resource-seeking FDI, the aim of the foreign firm is to 
exploit specialisation opportunities in different locations (production 
fragmentation). Therefore, this type of FDI is more concerned about trade cost, and 
as consequence; countries that pursue an open trade policy are more attracted to this 
type of investment, (Dunning 1993).  
 
In the literature, most of the studies that focus on FDI determinants in developing 
countries have taken into account the importance of trade openness effects on FDI. 
Liargovas and Skandalis (2010) examined the importance of trade openness for 
attracting FDI inflows, using a sample of 36 developing economies for the period 
between 1990 and 2008. Trade openness is measured by using eight different 
indicators. The main empirical findings of the panel regression analysis reveal that, 
in the long run, trade openness contributes positively to the inflows of FDI in 
developing economies. Sekkat and Varoudakis (2005; 2007) empirically verify that 
during the 1990s, low level of trade and foreign exchange liberalization compared 
to East Asia and Latin America played a determinant role in the low level of total 
FDI in the MENA economies, particularly in manufacturing. 
 
3.2.4. Macroeconomic Instability 
In the literature, most of the studies concerns of FDI determinants in developing 
countries have taken into account the effects of macroeconomic instability as one of 
the important FDI determinants (e.g. Singh and Jun 1995; Noorbakhsh, Paloni and 
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Youssef 2001; Mottaleb and Kalirajan 2010). Macroeconomic instability involves 
high inflation rates; volatilise exchange rates and high external debts. Foreign 
investors prefer to invest in a more macroeconomic stable environment that reflects 
a less degree of uncertainty. The rate of inflation as measured by the change in 
consumer price index (CPI) is commonly used as a proxy for the level of 
macroeconomic instability.  Asiedu (2005) analyses the flows of FDI into 22 Sub-
Saharan countries over the period 1984 to 2000 and found the effect of inflation on 
FDI inflows was statistically significant with an expected negative sign. Chan and 
Gemayel (2004) study the risk investment associated with macroeconomic 
instability in order to give an explanation of the FDI level in the MENA region. The 
standard deviation of the risk guide provided by the International Risk Guide is 
used as a measure of economic, financial and political instability. The results 
indicate that, especially for the MENA, instability has a much stronger effect on 
FDI then the risk itself. Jallab et al. (2008) analyse the effect of FDI on economic 
growth in the MENA region for the period 1970 to 2008 using a dynamic panel 
data model (GMM and 2SLS estimators). Their findings show that positive impact 
of FDI on economic growth depends on macroeconomic stability in the region. 
 
3.2.5. Natural Resources 
Despite the fact that the availability of natural resources has been declining in their 
importance relative to other FDI determinants, this factor still plays important role 
in attracting FDI, especially in developing countries. FDI inflows to Africa have 
increased in all the major oil-producing countries (including Sudan) as well as in 
Egypt and South Africa, (WIR 2005). In developing countries, FDI in natural 
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resources may occur when resource-abundant countries lack the capital and the 
required technology for resource-extraction activities, (Dunning 1993).  
 
Empirical evidence on FDI determinants show that some developing countries rich 
in natural resources were able to attract a large proportion of FDI inflows in 
comparison to other non-natural resource-abundant developing countries. This can 
be seen in the high demand of industrialising countries that sought to secure reliable 
sources of primary products, (Dunning 1993). Asiedu (2003) assesses the 
importance of natural resources and concludes that FDI to the Sub-Saharan African 
countries is still attracted by the availability of natural resources.  Onyeiwu and 
Shrestha (2004) have examined FDI determinant in Africa and conclude that 
natural resource availability still plays an important role in attracting FDI to Africa. 
Through the last decade or so, resource-seeking FDI has once again boomed, 
induced by the increasing demand and rise of commodity prices for oil and 
minerals. As a consequence, the rising returns in this sector have attracted a wave 
of investment, (WIR 2007). 
 
The effect of natural resources on FDI to MENA countries have also been 
investigated in the literature, however, there were only limited number have looked 
at their effect on FDI to MENA countries in particular. Mina (2007) examines the 
location determinants of FDI flows to the GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, 
Oman, Saudi Arabia and UAE) in the framework of the OLI paradigm. The study 
results indicate that, oil potential as measured by oil reserves and oil utilisation as 
measured by oil production have negative effects in the flows of FDI. However, the 
relative degree of oil utilisation to oil reserves has a positive influence on FDI. 
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Elfakhani and Mater (2007) investigate the determinants of FDI in the MENA 
countries over the period 1990-2000. They found that the main determinants of FDI 
flow to these countries are the previous year’s FDI, country openness, the country 
membership to the World Trade Organization and being an oil-producing country.  
 
3.2.6.  Quality of Institutions 
Institutions were defined by North (1990) as the rule of the game in a society. 
Institutions can be formal, like constitutions and law, or informal such as inherited 
customs. As suggested by North, institutions can affect economic activities through 
the operating environment of the investing firms. A poor quality business 
environment can increase the production costs and make the investment less 
profitable. The presence of excessive regulations and the long delays in setting up 
businesses impose additional costs to the production costs and reduce the 
competitiveness of the firms. In terms of FDI, the protection of property rights is 
the main priority for foreign investors. If property rights are not protected, FDI 
could face the risk of expropriation.  
 
Kaufmann et al. (2010, p4) also define governance broadly as ‘’the traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process 
by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect 
of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social 
interactions among them’’. 
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 Most empirical evidence from the literature on FDI determinants in developing 
countries support the view that the quality of institutions in the host country is a 
factor that can, to a greater extent, deter or promote FDI inflows (e.g. Wheeler and 
Mody 1992; Wei 2000; Globerman and Shapiro 2002; Benassy-Quere et al. 2007; 
Daniele and Marani 2007). 
 
Shang Jin Wei (2000) studies the effect of corruption on FDI flows in a sample of 
45 host countries. The study finds that an increase in the corruption level of the host 
country tends to reduce inward FDI. Globerman and Shapiro (2002) investigate the 
effects of governance infrastructure4 on both inflows and outflows of a country’s 
FDI. They found that good governance has a positive effect on both FDI inflows 
and outflows. The study also concludes that the host country’s good governance 
infrastructure not only attracts FDI, but it also creates the conditions under which 
domestic multinational corporations emerge and invest abroad. Singh and Jun 
(1995) extend the earlier studies of the determinants of FDI in developing countries 
by empirically analysing qualitative variables such as political risk, business and 
macroeconomic conditions. Their findings indicate that all these factors are 
important determinant factors, especially for countries that have historically 
attracted high FDI flows. 
 
There are only a few studies in the literature on FDI determinants that have looked 
to the relationship between democracy and FDI in the host country. Asiedu and 
                                                          
4 Governance infrastructure is defined as the combination of political, institutional and legal environment. 
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Lien (2010) empirically examine the impact of democracy on FDI (using the 
interaction term between democracy and natural resources in the host country) for 
112 resource-exporting and non-resource exporting developing countries and found 
that the effect of democracy on FDI is positive only for the non-resource exporting 
countries. They suggest that FDI flows to resource-exporting countries might be 
altered by the presence of natural resources in these countries. Bissoon (2012) 
investigates the role played by quality of institutions in FDI inflows to a selection 
of 45 developing countries in the African, Latin American and Asian regions. The 
results show that the level of FDI inflows is significantly related to the quality of 
institutions and this relationship is robust to the use of control variables and 
alternative indicators of governance as well as an aggregate governance index. 
Furthermore, the impact of an improvement in the overall institutional condition on 
the level FDI is more sizeable than progress made in individual institutional 
indicators due to the complementary nature of the different aspects of governance. 
More specifically, the results show that macroeconomic stability in terms of a less 
volatile inflation rate, efficient and less corrupt institutions, a good regulatory 
framework and political stability would have a positive impact on the FDI inflows 
of the countries in their sample. 
 
Although the roles of institutions as determinant factors in developing countries 
have been widely investigated, MENA countries have received less attention in this 
matter. Vittorio and Ugo (2006) examine the quality of institutions in MENA 
countries relative to their inflows of FDI from the world. The authors used 
Kaufmann et al.’s (2005) governance indicators to perform a cross-sectional 
regression analysis for a sample of 129 countries in order to explain the relative 
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performance of FDI. The results indicate that the weak institutional framework in 
MENA countries does matter and show the relative disadvantages of MENA 
countries in attracting FDI. The study suggests that the MENA region is in need of 
deep institutional reform in order to advance their attractiveness for foreign 
investors. Jay Van Wyk and Lal (2010) investigate the factors that encourage and 
inhibit FDI flows to countries in the MENA region following what they called the 
‘’New Institutional Economics approach’’. Their findings confirm that various 
economic and institutional factors are indeed significant determinants of FDI, 
including economic growth, current account deficits, trade openness and less 
restrictive business regulations.  
 
To sum up, there is wide range of empirical studies that have alike try to identify 
what factor can explain the flow of FDI to particular countries. Among many of the 
suggested theoretical and empirical explanations for FDI phenomenon, the OLI 
model stands out to be a useful framework in providing explanation to most 
important factors that are associated with the location dimension of the OLI 
paradigm. Factor such as market size and growth, openness to trade, 
macroeconomic stability, the availability of infrastructure and good quality of 
institutions, natural resources and human capital have been frequently identified as 
important determinants for FDI especially for developing countries. 
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3.3. Review on FDI and Performance of Firms  
In the literature on FDI, the question of whether FDI can contribute positively or 
negatively to the performance of domestic firms has been concern of many studies 
especially in developing countries that aim to advance their level of development 
and prosperity of their nations. Many policy makers in developing countries sought 
to attract FDI for various reasons. One of the most important reasons is that FDI 
can generate positive externalities to the domestic firms through transfer of 
technology know-how. Technology diffusion may occur from labor turnover as 
domestic employees move from foreign to domestic firms. These spill-overs, in the 
long term, may have important impacts on the productivity and development of 
host economy.  
Early contributions such as Caves (1974), Dunning (1977) and Blomstrom (1986) 
indicated that foreign firms are more productive than their domestic counterparts 
and that the participation of foreign firms has a positive impact on domestic firms’ 
performance. In the literature, there are large numbers of studies that have 
investigated the above question and reach similar conclusion. Javorcik (2004) also 
provides evidences consistent with the findings of the earlier studies about the 
positive productivity spillover from foreign to domestic firms. However, it has been 
also argued that the presence of foreign firms in the local market can have adverse 
effect on the performance of domestic firms and industry in general. As suggested 
by the industrial organisation theory, foreign firms tend to completely internalise 
their activities in order to maximise their profits and monopolise the market. This 
behaviour can limit the benefits of domestic firms in two ways. A first, intensified 
competition can omit domestic firms from the market if technology gap between 
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foreign and domestic firms is too large. A second, low level of education in the host 
country can also limit hiring domestic employee resulting in very little spillovers to 
the local industry.  
 There are several studies suggesting that the effects of foreign presence are not 
always beneficial for domestic firms. For instance, Aitken and Harrison (1999) 
used a panel of more than 4000 Venezuelan firms and found that foreign ownership 
negatively affect the productivity of wholly domestically owned firms in the same 
industry . Konings (2000) also found a negative spillover from foreign to domestic 
firms in Bulgaria and Romania, and no and no spillovers in Poland. Haddad and 
Harrison (1994) employ a unique firm-level dataset to test for spillovers in the 
Moroccan manufacturing sector and found that the dispersion of productivity is 
smaller in sectors with more foreign firms. Their results show that firms with some 
foreign ownership exhibit higher level of overall multi-factor productivity. 
However, the rate of growth of productivity is higher for their wholly domestically-
owned firms. 
Competition is also considered to be an important factor that can affect the 
performance of firms in the host country. The entrance of foreign firms into the 
local market can increase product market competition with domestic firms and its 
effects can be either positive or negative on the performance of the local industry. 
On one hand, increasing competition between foreign and domestic firms may force 
domestic firms to improve the efficiency of their production process in order to 
keep their position in the market, (Blomstrom and Kokko 1998). On the other hand, 
competition can also have a negative effect on domestic firms by limiting their 
market share and economy of scales benefits. Foreign firms that possess superior 
technology advantage over domestic firms may able to divert demand for domestic 
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inputs to imported inputs, which means that the local supplier firms are not able to 
benefit from potential economics of scale, (Aitken and Harrison 1999). This 
negative effect believed to be a major obstacle in some developing countries 
because of wide technology gap between the foreign investing firms and domestic 
firms. 
One of the most important factors in market structure and firm performance is the 
relative size and the number of firms in the industry. Firms expected to exercise 
more market power if there are only few firms in the industry or they are large in 
their size relatively to the size of other firms. Another view about the role of firm 
size on the structure of the market is that large firms may have more difficulty to 
restructure themselves than smaller firms; however, they may have preferential 
access to financing which may as result promote their capacity to restructure. 
Empirical evidence about the relationship between size of the firm and its 
performance are not conclusive. Some studies have shown that larger firms are 
more productive than smaller ones due to factors such as better access to 
technology, managerial skills, finance, and learning (Castany et al. 2005; Pagés 
2010). At the other extreme, the flexible, non-hierarchical structure of small firms 
can give these firms a productivity advantage, (Geroski 1998; Tybout 2000). 
Performance of firms can also be identified based on other important factors related 
to the investment climate conditions. Recent studies concerns firm level FDI has 
incorporate investment climate obstacles as location factors and evaluates their 
importance to the entry of foreign firms into the local market. The variables that 
jointly define the investment climate include factors such as infrastructure, access 
to finance, education of labor, government regulations, political stability, role of 
law and corruption. Dethier et al. (2010) provide a valuable survey to the recent 
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literature which examines the impact of the business climate on productivity and 
growth in developing countries using World Bank enterprise surveys. Accordingly, 
the literature that has analysed this data provides evidence that a good business 
climate favours growth by encouraging investment and higher productivity. The 
authors state their motivation for their review ‘’by explaining why a disaggregated, 
firm-level analysis of the relationship between enterprise performance and business 
climate—as opposed to a more macro-aggregate analysis—is important to gaining 
insights into these issues’’ (Dethier et al. 2010, p 258).  
There are many difficulties have been identified in the literature as an obstacles that 
can hinder to great extent the performance and growth of firms in developing 
countries. For instance, access to finance, technology level, education of 
employees, government regulations are all considered to be determinant factors that 
can affect the performance of firms especially in developing countries. One of the 
most severe constraints for the performance of firms and growth in developing 
countries is the availability and reliability of good electricity sources.  Many 
industrial firms in these countries have suffered various degrees of poor quality in 
the electricity services. The problem with electricity in developing countries is 
mainly associated with infrastructure development. The power sector in most of 
these countries remains underdeveloped and, therefore, disruption in the electricity 
supply is often expected. Moyo (2012) examines the impact of power disruptions 
on firm productivity in the manufacturing sector in Nigeria and found that power 
outage variables (measured as hours per day without power and percentage of 
output lost due to power disruptions) have a negative and significant effect on 
productivity, particularly on small firms. Unreliable electricity supplies are a major 
constraint to private sector development in MENA countries. According to the 
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World Bank survey data, over 50% of firms operating in MENA region identifying 
such deficits as major obstacle for the productivity and growth of their firms. The 
survey also reveal that MENA experiences more power outages, and with longer 
durations, than any other region in the world.  
The availability of financial resources is considered to be an important aspect of a 
firm’s performance in developing countries. Access to finance is needed to ensure 
flexibility in resource allocation and to reduce the impact of cash flow problems. 
Hericourt and Poncet (2009) assess the role played by FDI in alleviating domestic 
firms’ credit constraints. The results confirm that the development of cross-border 
relationships with foreign firms helps private domestic firms to bypass both the 
financial and legal obstacles that they face at home. Excessive government 
regulations are also expected to hinder the performance and growth of firms. 
However, in developing countries, excessive government regulations can be 
associated with informal payments that often come in the form of bribes to secure 
infrastructure services such as telephone, electricity and water connections. 
Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2006) investigate the relationship between investment 
climate and economic growth using firm-level data on 1,500 firms in five big 
Chinese cities. The results indicate that many of the excessive sets of regulations 
are associated indirectly with corruption and infrastructure in the form of informal 
payments for inspectors to get things done.  
Empirical studies on MENA countries are scant and there were only few studies 
that have used firm level data to investigate the impact of foreign ownership on the 
performance of domestic firms and industries (see Atyias, 2011 for wider review). 
Ben Naceur et al. (2007) examine the financial and operating performance of 95 
newly privatized firms in four MENA countries namely, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, 
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and Turkey during the period 1990 to 2001. The results show that these firms 
experienced significant increases in profitability and operating efficiency, and 
significant declines in employment and leverage. Gurbuz and Aybars (2010) 
explore how the financial performance of the companies listed on the Istanbul stock 
exchange is affected by foreign ownership. The results of their study indicate that 
foreign ownership improves firm financial performance in Turkey up to a certain 
level, beyond which additional ownership by the foreigners does not add to firm 
profitability.  
The availability of educated and skilled workers is very important for firm and 
industry performance especially for developing countries. Access to skilled labour 
facilitates the connection to regional and global value chains, as lead firms often 
expect suppliers to meet international quality standards. Firms may find it difficult 
to grow or to remain competitive because they are unable to fill jobs that require 
workers who have the right knowledge and skills (ASTD 2012). O’Sullivan et al. 
(2011) indicate that there is a persistent gap between the skills acquired at 
university and the requirements of business in MENA countries, while firms often 
refer to the lack of suitable skills as an important constraint to hiring. Achy and 
Sekkat (2010) used a sample of 664 large, medium- and small-sized firms covering 
seven industries in Morocco to investigate whether the difference in their attitudes 
toward investment in human and physical capital explains their difference in terms 
of job creation. The results support that such investment allows firms to create jobs, 
and this is robust to the inclusion of various additional explanatory variables, firm 
size and the industry coverage of the sample. The results also show that investment 
in training and new machinery is creating jobs mainly in the textile, garment and 
leather industries. These are precisely the most important industries in Morocco in 
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terms of employment. The results suggest, that training offered by a firm to its 
workers and investment in new machinery could be a good complement to 
governments efforts to reduce unemployment. Corruption also reported as major 
obstacle for growth in most of the firms surveyed in the MENA region, with firms 
reporting that informal payments are conventional often to smooth frequent 
inspections from authorities.  
Furthermore, In the MENA region, the availability of financial sources considered 
to be one of the biggest obstacles for the performance and growth of firms in the 
region. Most of the firms surveyed by the World Bank reported credit constraint as 
one of the biggest obstacles for a firm’s performance and growth. Achy et al. 
(2009) points out that access to finance is one of the major financial constraints 
affecting the performance of manufacturing firms in Morocco. Small firms tend to 
increase their debt instead of opening their capital to outside investors, while larger 
firms seem to rely much more on their retained earnings for their long-term 
financial needs. Corruption also identified as one of the biggest obstacles for 
performance and growth of firms in MENA region. O’Sullivan et al. (2011) 
indicate that fighting corruption and strengthening the rule of law are essential for 
economic growth and development in the MENA region. They mentioned also that 
cronyism, or granting contracts based on personal relationships to a privileged few, 
may distort market competition and prevent government efficiency.  
To summarise our review, there is a wide range of studies concern the relationship 
between FDI and performance of firms.  Most of these studies support the view that 
the presence of foreign firms in one way or another can be beneficial to the overall 
industry in the host country. Developing countries however, do not benefit from 
FDI equally and their benefits depend mainly on the host country’s economic and 
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institutional factors. Recent studies suggest that there is a systematic pattern where 
various host industry and host country characteristics influence the benefits from 
FDI. These benefits seem to be larger in countries and industries where the 
educational level of the local labour force is higher, where local competition is 
stronger, and where the host country has better economic and institutional 
conditions. Furthermore, our review to the literature of FDI and performance of 
firms indicate that there is scarcity in studies concern MENA countries at micro 
level. Most of FDI studies on MENA countries have been conducted at macro level. 
Scarcity of research at micro level is often associated with the difficulty of 
obtaining enough firm level data (see Atyias, 2011). However, in recent years, firm 
level data become available for some MENA countries and researchers start to 
make use of it. The World Bank Enterprise Survey database is a valuable source of 
firms level data however, there is no much studies have employed such data for 
research in MENA countries. The World Bank Enterprise Survey is a firm-level 
survey data set that includes structural variables related to size of the firm, 
ownership, competition and also business environment variables such as , 
electricity outages, financial constraints, education of labour and quality of 
institutions.  Therefore, one of the aims of this thesis is to go beyond previous 
studies and provide new evidences on the impacts of FDI on the performance of 
firms in MENA region using a unique firm level survey data. 
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Chapter 4  
 
Gravity Model in Trade and Investment 
 
4.1. Theoretical Development of the Gravity Model  
The theoretical background of the gravity model has been derived initially from 
physical science (Newton's law of gravitys) and then applied in international trade 
and investment. The model has been empirically successful; however, the 
theoretical foundations for the model are a subject of some dispute. An earlier 
application of the gravity model in trade was conducted by Tinbergen (1962), 
Poyhonen (1963) and then Linnemann (1966). They observed that exports are 
positively affected by income of the trading countries, while the distance between 
the countries is likely to affect exports negatively. Accordingly, the flow of bilateral 
trade can be explained by the following specification: 
 
𝑃𝑋𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽0(𝑌𝑖)𝛽1(𝑌𝑗)𝛽2(𝐷𝑖𝑗)𝛽3(𝐴𝑖𝑗)𝛽4𝑢𝑖𝑗 
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Where, 𝑃𝑋𝑖𝑗 is the value of trade from country i to country j, 𝑌𝑖 ,𝑌𝑗 is the value of 
GDP for countries i and j, 𝐷𝑖𝑗 is the geographical distance between the economic 
centre of countries i and j, 𝐴𝑖𝑗 is other factors that aid or resist the trade flow 
between countries i and j, and 𝑢𝑖𝑗 is the distributed error term with E (𝑙𝑛 𝑢𝑖𝑗) =0. 
In the literature of international trade, the gravity model has been used to test 
hypotheses deeply rooted in pure economic theories of trade. For instance, the 
standard hypothesis of the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model  that prices of traded goods 
are the same all over the world has, proved to be inconsistent due to the presence of 
the so-called ‘’border effects’’, in order to account for these border effects, the 
prices of traded goods need to differ for each country.  
Anderson (1979) provides the first attempt to derive a theoretical basis for the 
gravity model based on constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES). The model 
assumed that goods are differentiated by country of origin and consumers have 
preferences defined over all the differentiated products. This assumption would 
imply that, a country will consume at least some of every good from every country. 
All goods are tradable, all countries trade and, in equilibrium, national income is 
the sum of home and foreign demand for the unique good that each country 
produces. 
 Bergstrand (1985) argues that the gravity model is application of a model of trade 
based on the monopolistic competition theory developed by Paul Krugman (1980). 
Accordingly, identical countries trade differentiated goods because consumers have 
variety in their preferences. Therefore, models with monopolistic competition 
overcome the undesirable feature of Armington models whereby goods are 
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differentiated by location of production as assumed. Deardorff (1995) derived the 
gravity equation from the Heckscher-Ohlin model with firstly, frictionless trade and 
identical preferences, where random choice of trading partners by consumers and 
producers is assumed and secondly with trade impediments assuming unequal 
factor prices. Deardorff’ work proved that gravity equation characterizes many 
models and can be justified from standard trade theories.  
Feenstra et al. (2001) also argues that a gravity-type equation can arise from a wide 
range of models, though they have subtly different implications for the coefficient 
estimates, depending on whether goods are homogenous or differentiated and 
whether or not there are barriers to entry. The study empirical work for 
differentiated goods provides results consistent with the theoretical predictions of 
the monopolistic-competition model (reciprocal-dumping model) with free entry. 
Homogenous goods are described by a model national (Armington) product 
differentiation or by a reciprocal dumping model with barriers to entry.   
 
4.2. Anderson–van Wincoop Gravity Equation (2003) 
The contribution of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) was particularly important 
for estimating the trade cost effects. They show that controlling for relative trade 
costs is crucial for a well-specified gravity model. Theoretically, their results show 
that bilateral trade is determined by relative trade costs. This means the propensity 
of the importing country j to import from the exporting country i is determined by 
the importing country’s trade cost toward the exporting country relative to its 
overall “resistance” to imports and to the average “resistance” facing the exporting 
country in “multilateral trade-resistance” terms. McCallum (1995) analyses the 
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trade patterns between Canadian provinces and U.S. states. His findings reveal that 
Canadian provinces trade more than 20 times as much among each other than 
Canadian provinces and U.S. states do. This phenomenon is often described as the 
border puzzle since country borders seem to have a significant effect on trade 
patterns between countries. 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) show that in a context of world with variety of 
goods differentiated by the country of origin, a well-specified theoretically gravity 
equation can be specified as following: 
 
𝑥𝑖𝑗 =  𝑦𝑖 𝑦𝑗𝑦  � 𝑡𝑖𝑗𝜋𝑖𝑃𝑗�1−𝜎 
 
Where Y is the world GDP, Yi and Yj is the GDP of countries i and j respectively, 
tij (one plus the tariff equivalent of overall trade costs) is the cost in country j of 
importing a good from country i, σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution, and Πi and 
Pj is the exporter and importer ease of market access or country i’s outward and 
country j’s inward multilateral resistance terms. 
In the linear form of the gravity equation, other determinant geographical factors 
such as common language, adjacency and colonial history were added to the model 
to capture the information costs. The linear gravity model estimated by Anderson 
and van Wincoop can be described as follows: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑗 =  𝑘 + 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖 +  𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑗 + (1 − 𝜎)𝜌 𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑗 + (1 − 𝜎)𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑖𝑗 + (1 − 𝜎)𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖+ 
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(1- 𝜎)𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 
Where 𝑥𝑖𝑗  𝑖𝑠 the value of exports from country i to country j, 𝑦𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑗  are the 
income (GDP) of each country, 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is the bilateral distance between country i and 
country j, 𝑏𝑖𝑗 is a dummy variable for shared borders. 𝑃𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑗 are the multilateral 
resistance terms. 
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) investigate the effects of trade costs on the 
pattern of trade across countries. Their survey results indicate that poor countries 
face even higher trade costs and there is a lot of variation across countries and across 
goods within countries. The structural gravity model as exposited and extended in 
their survey offers the potential for theoretically consistent and more precise 
estimates of key implicit trade costs.  They argue that the extensions of existing 
gravity models, better treatment of aggregation and endogeneity problems, and better 
estimates of substitution elasticities are all likely to improve our understanding of 
trade costs. 
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that the standard empirical methods used to 
estimate log linear gravity equations are inappropriate because of the presence of 
heteroskedasticity.  An additional problem of log-linearisation is that it is 
incompatible with the existence of zeroes in trade data, which led to several 
unsatisfactory solutions, including truncation of the sample by elimination of zero-
trade pairs and further nonlinear transformations of the dependent variable. Instead, 
the authors propose a simple Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood method and 
assess its performance using Monte Carlo simulations. The study found that, in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity, the standard methods can severely bias the estimated 
coefficients, casting doubt on previous empirical findings. For instance, in both the 
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traditional and Anderson–van Wincoop specifications of the gravity equation, OLS 
estimation exaggerates the role of geographical proximity and colonial ties. 
Theoretical and empirical studies that concern the role of firm heterogeneity and 
trade have generated new insights for the gravity equation by underlining a 
distinction between the extensive margin (the measure of exporting firms) and the 
intensive margin (average exports conditional on exporting). Bernard et al. (2007) 
uses a basic gravity equation to examine whether the effect of distance on bilateral 
trade operates through the extensive margin (the number of firms and the number of 
products) or the intensive margin (value per product per firm). He decomposes the 
aggregate value of US exports to a particular destination into three factors: the 
contribution of the number of firms exporting to the destination; the number of 
products exported to the destination; and the average value of exports per product per 
firm. By decompose the aggregate value of US exports into three components 
(exporting firms, exported products and average of exports per product per firm), 
Bernard et al estimate gravity equations for the aggregate value of exports and each 
of these three components. The findings suggest that aggregate trade relationships 
are heavily influenced by extensive-margin adjustments both in terms of the number 
of destinations and the number of exported products. 
Chaney (2008) introduces firm heterogeneity to the gravity model by expanding 
Melitz’s5 gravity model and introduces fixed export costs and adjustments on the 
extensive margin in a simple model of international trade. The main finding of this 
paper is that the elasticity of substitution has opposite effects on each margin. A 
higher elasticity makes the intensive margin more sensitive to changes in trade 
barriers, whereas it makes the extensive margin less sensitive.   
                                                          
5 Melitz (2003) pioneered the firm-level heterogeneity theory (firms face fixed and variable costs of exporting). 
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Helpman et al. (2008) argues that standard specifications of the gravity equation 
impose symmetry that is inconsistent with the data and that this too biases the 
estimates. They develop a theoretical trade model that predicts positive as well as 
zero trade flows between countries and use the theory to derive estimation 
procedures that exploit the information contained in data sets of trading and non-
trading countries. Their developed model yields a generalised gravity equation that 
accounts for the self-selection of firms into export markets and their impact on trade 
volumes. The empirical work proposes a two stage estimation procedure that uses an 
equation for selection into trade partners in the first stage and a trade flow equation 
in the second. The study results show that traditional estimates are biased and that 
most of the bias is due not to selection but rather due to the omission of the extensive 
margin. 
Lawless (2010) utilises a data from the US Census Bureau, detailing exports and 
numbers of exporting firms from the US to 156 destination markets, to decompose 
total exports into number of firms and average export sales per firm. Lawless’ 
analysis goes beyond Bernard et al. (2007) work in two important respects. Firstly, 
Lawless extends the extensive and intensive margin regressions by adding more 
variables such as common language, influences of internal geography, and 
infrastructure. Secondly, Lawless show how these results can be interpreted in the 
context of a standard heterogeneous firms model of exporting by using a simplified 
version of the Melitz (2003) model to show how various factors will affect the two 
margins.  
Unlike the popular gravity work of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), which 
feature homogeneous firms and no extensive margin, Lawless results strongly 
confirm the predictions of the Melitz theoretical framework. Furthermore, the results 
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indicate that only size of the market and some proxies for communications 
infrastructure had a robustly significant effect on the intensive margin, with these 
variables having negative effects. To the extent that these communications networks 
can reduce the fixed costs associated with trade, these results are also consistent with 
the Meltiz model.  
Chen and Novy (2011) derived a micro-founded measure of bilateral trade 
integration by modelling disaggregated trade flows at the industry level using gravity 
framework pioneered by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) with heterogeneous 
trade costs and heterogeneous elasticities of substitution across industries.  The 
authors show that their trade integration measure is also consistent with other classes 
of models including the Ricardian model by Eaton and Kortum (2002) and recent 
heterogeneous firms’ models. The empirical work in this study based on data for 163 
manufacturing industries across the European Union for the years 1999 to 2003. The 
results from the empirical application of the model indicate that a substantial degree 
of heterogeneity across industries both for the substitution elasticities and the degree 
of trade integration. For instance, trade integration appears particularly low for 
industries characterized by high transportation costs. In contrast, trade costs appear to 
be not important for some of the high-tech industries. The results also indicate that 
trade integration is also severely hampered by policy factors, in particular Technical 
Barriers to Trade and in transparent public procurement procedures. For public 
policy the study findings suggest that gains from improved international trade 
integration are possible especially through the elimination of Technical Barriers to 
Trade. 
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4.3. Empirical Applications of the Gravity Model 
Since the earlier application of the gravity model in trade by Tinbergen (1962), 
Poyhonen (1963) and Linnemann (1966), the gravity model has been widely used 
as an analytical tool for explaining flows of international trade. The application of 
the gravity model has shown significant empirical robustness and explanatory 
power for describing trade flows and investment. However, the empirical 
application of the gravity model have often been faced with estimation problems 
such as the issue of the presence of heteroskedasticity in trade data or the existence 
of zero flows, which make the estimation of the logarithm unfeasible. 
Matyas (1997) argues that all gravity type models used to predict the effects of 
regional blocks such as APEC, MECOSUR and NAFTA are miss-specified from an 
econometric point of view. He then demonstrates empirically how this lead to the 
incorrect interpretation of the trading blocs dummy and improper economic 
inference. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) argue that the proper specification of a 
panel gravity model should include main (exporter, importer, and time) as well as 
time invariant exporter-by-importer (bilateral) interaction effects. Using a panel of 
bilateral exports for 11 APEC countries over the period 1982–1998, their empirical 
analysis suggest that a two-way model is preferable, since bilateral interaction 
terms account for a large part of the variation in addition to the explanatory 
variables and the main effects (time, exporter and importer) and are highly 
significant. Choosing a three-way formulation ignores relevant information and 
may cause an omitted variable bias. In that case, one may obtain wrong measures of 
the export and import propensities of countries. Moreover, the projection of 
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bilateral trade relations is misleading and gives imprecise forecasts with 
unnecessary large confidence intervals. 
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) were the first to address the problem of 
heterogeneity between countries in the gravity model. To solve that problem, they 
introduce a new theoretical framework for the gravity equation that includes a 
theoretical specification for the multilateral resistance term. Carrere et al. (2004) 
uses a gravity model to assess ex-post regional trade agreements including 130 
countries with panel data during the period 1962–1996. The estimation method of 
the gravity model were augmented with country-pairs dummies in order to takes 
into account the unobservable characteristics of trade partner countries and also the 
endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables. The study results show that 
regional agreements have generated a significant increase in trade between 
members, often at the expense of the rest of the world. 
Stack (2009) evaluates the effect of European regional integration on trade using 
two types of gravity model (traditional and new trade gravity model) and a panel 
dataset of bilateral export flows from 12 EU countries to 20 OECD trading partners 
during the period 1992–2003. The estimation of the gravity models was conducted 
using several variants of the fixed effects models in order to allow for differing 
degrees of space and time heterogeneity. The results indicate that the coefficient 
estimates are plausible in sign and significance across all specifications. Focusing 
on the econometric properties of the gravity model, the preferred model constitutes 
the full effects design which allows for the greatest degree of heterogeneity. The 
positive and significant coefficient estimate of the EU dummy variable declines in 
magnitude as an increasing degree of heterogeneity is allowed in the model and 
becomes insignificant for the full effects model. Herrera (2013) argues that several 
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problems related with the empirical application of the gravity model of 
international trade still remain unsolved. The unobserved heterogeneity, the 
presence of heteroskedasticity in trade data or the existence of zero flows, which 
make the estimation of the logarithm unfeasible, are some of them. Herrera’s study 
provides a survey of the most recent literature concerning the specification methods 
of the gravity equations and found that that the Heckman sample selection model 
performs better overall for the specification of gravity equation selected.  
Antonucci and Manzocchi (2006) applied the gravity model to Turkey’s trade flows 
over 1967-2001 to check whether this model fits Turkey’s geographical pattern of 
trade in goods and assess whether Turkey already has a special trade relation with 
the EU, namely whether merchandise exchanges between the two parties exceed 
what the gravity approach predicts. Their main findings imply that: i) the gravity 
model provides a good fit of Turkey’s trade patterns; and ii) despite the 1963 
Association agreement, and the customs union launched in 1996, there is no 
evidence of additional trade between Turkey and the EU.  
Ekanayake et al. (2010) use a gravity mode to analyses the trade creation and trade 
diversion effects of the regional trade agreements (RTAs) in Asia, and their effects 
on intra-regional trade flows using annual trade data for the period 1980-2009. The 
findings of their study are, for the most part, consistent with findings of previous 
studies on the Asian trade flows. The coefficients of real GDP, population, and 
distance had expected signs and magnitudes in all models estimated. Cheng and 
Wall (2005) compare various specifications of the gravity model of trade as nested 
versions of a general specification that uses bilateral country-pair fixed effects to 
control for heterogeneity. Their results show that the theoretical restrictions used to 
obtain them from the general model are not supported statistically. Because the 
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gravity model has become the “workhorse” baseline model for estimating the 
effects of international integration, this has important empirical implications. In 
particular, that, unless heterogeneity is accounted for correctly, gravity models can 
greatly overestimate the effects of integration on the volume of trade.  
De Mello-Sampayo (2009) argues that competing-destinations formulation of the 
gravity model ensues from the fact that unlike the classical version, this approach 
explicitly acknowledges the interdependence of the flows between a set of 
alternative locations, i.e. country-recipients are competing for FDI. In order to test 
for this hypothesis, she empirically examines a range of theoretical hypotheses 
about the determinants of FDI location in a panel data regression framework. The 
results of the estimation of a gravity model lend support to the proximity-
concentration and internalization hypotheses. Also, the fact that FDI has been found 
to be decreasing in the competition posed by alternative locations is suggestive of 
the superiority of the competing-destinations version of the gravity equation over 
its classical formulation. 
Kleinert and Toubal (2010) provide theoretical underpinnings of the gravity 
equation applied to the analysis of sales of foreign affiliates of multinational firms. 
The authors argue that the success of the gravity equation results from the fact that 
it can be derived from various theoretical models. They illustrate their point by 
deriving a gravity equation from three different models of multinational firms. 
Using data on real affiliate sales, they show empirically how the gravity equation 
can nevertheless be used to discriminate between the different theoretical models.  
Zwinkels and Beugelsdijk (2010) argue that, against the background of its increased 
popularity and data availability, a range of commonly made econometric mistakes 
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have recently been discussed in the literature, mostly pertaining to the (omitted) 
characteristics of countries or country pairs in gravity models. The study 
concentrates on the possible non-stationarity of both the dependent variable (trade 
or FDI flows) and of one or more of the explanatory variables. They empirically 
show that there is indeed a problem with the non-stationarity of variables 
commonly used in gravity equations, not correcting for this yields overestimated 
results and, as consequence, they propose an effective solution for this problem. 
Theoretically, the use of the gravity model in explaining FDI flows is supported by 
the most well-known Dunning eclectic paradigm. Accordingly, the market size and 
the proximity of markets are considered to be fundamental and influencing factors 
for FDI decisions. Most of the previous studies concerning FDI determinants have 
included them as explanatory factors and conclude that there is a robust relationship 
between the volume of FDI and the size of the host market, (Agarwal 1980; 
Wheeler and Mody 1992). 
Grosse and Trevino (1996) examine the determinants of FDI flows to the US by 
country of origin of investment over the period 1980 to 1992 using a gravity model 
framework. The study results indicate that the main significant positive influences 
are the home country's exports to the US and the home country market size. 
Significant negative influences include the home country's imports from the US, the 
cultural and geographic distances of the home country from the US, and the 
exchange rate. Stone and Jeon (1999) used applied the general form of the gravity 
equation from Anderson (1979) to analysis the bilateral FDI flows for the years 
1987-1993 within the Asia-Pacific region. The study results showed that FDI flows 
in the region were mainly driven by market size and income in the home country 
rather than factors in the host country.  
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Benassy-Quere et al. (2007) use a gravity model to study the impact of institutional 
quality on bilateral FDI flows between 14 OCED countries and 42 developing 
countries. Their results indicate that public efficiency in a broad sense is a major 
determinant of inward FDI. This includes tax systems, simplicity to create a 
company, lack of corruption, transparency, contract law, security of property rights, 
efficiency of justice and prudential standards. Also, the extent of competition is 
shown to be of importance in this study, although capital concentration in both the 
source and the destination country has a positive impact on FDI.  
The application of the gravity model on trade and investment in developing 
countries is vast in number, however; among these studies, there are only few 
studies that examine the determinant of trade and investment in the context of Intra-
MENA trade and FDI.  Limam and Abdalla (1989) investigate the determinants of 
intra-Arab trade over the period 1984 to 1995 using a gravity model and sectorial 
panel data at three levels: total commodity trade, non-oil commodity trade, and 
commodity trade classified according to the SITC one digit level. The estimation 
results show that inter-Arab trade is positively affected by the size of the trading 
countries and also by whether they are members of either GCC or AMU. 
Transportation costs (measured by physical distance in KM) and political factors 
are found to be important deterrents to inter-Arab trade. 
 Al-Atrash and Yousef (2000) estimates a gravity model using maximum likelihood 
(Tobit) estimator to address the issue of whether intra-Arab trade is too little. The 
authors used a dataset consists of 18 Arab countries and 43 other countries that 
represent over 90 percent of the exports and imports of the Arab world over the 
period 1995 to 1997. The study results suggest that intra-Arab trade and Arab trade 
with the rest of the world are lower than what would be predicted by the gravity 
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equation, suggesting considerable scope for regional - as well as multilateral - 
integration. The results also suggest that intra-GCC and intra-Maghreb trade are 
relatively low while the Mashreq countries exhibit a higher level of intra-group 
trade.  
Bolbol and Fatheldin (2005) developed augmented gravity model to investigate 
empirically the determinants of intra-Arab exports and FDI during the 1997-2003 
period. The model was estimated with two data sets, one for trade among the Arab 
countries and one for trade with their major world trading partners. The results 
show that the basic variables of the gravity model carry the expected sign. 
However, with income elasticities at less than one, Arab exports seem to be 
characterized by limited product differentiation. Dummies involving the GCC FDI 
with each of the Arab sub-region blocks Mashreq and Maghreb were found to be 
positive and significant, reflecting the ‘’deep pockets” of GCC investors. 
 Abdalmoulah and Laabas (2007) studied the location determinants of intraregional 
Arab FDI using an augmented gravity model based on both standard gravity 
variables such as distance, borders, income and population of both sending and 
receiving countries. The dataset used in this study consist of a panel data of 17 Arab 
countries covering 10 annual periods 1998 to 2007.The authors argue that better 
treatment for zero in their dataset is to keep the log linearization while keeping zero 
flows in the data by using the ‘’inverse hyperbolic sine function’’6 which is 
equivalent to the log function and in the same time defined for zero. The 
specification of the gravity model augmented with institutional variables to account 
for the role of quality of institutions in the home countries on FDI as well as with 
                                                          
6 The inverse hyperbolic sine function is defined as follows  𝑆𝑖𝑛ℎ−1 = 𝑙𝑛 �𝑥 + (1 + 𝑥2)1 2� � 
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other dummy such as GCC sender dummy to account for the effects of rich oil 
countries as the driver force for intraregional Arab FDI. The study concludes that 
interregional Arab FDI is mainly determined by both total wealth (total GDP) of 
both home and host countries and inversely deterred by the average individual 
income ( GDP per capita income) and population. The results also indicate that 
bilateral FDI flows are likely to be larger between neighbours, having already well-
established trade movements. Empirical evidence on quality of institutions as 
measured by the World Bank governance indicators shows that political stability 
and control of corruption are negatively affecting intraregional Arab FDI flows.  
 Elafif (2008) also uses a gravity model and a panel data fixed effects to analysis 
the determinants of Intra-Arab FDI during the period 1985 to 2005. The empirical 
results support the argument that intra-Arab FDI increases with both the GDP of the 
home country and the per-capita GDP of the host country. Political stability also 
found to plays an important role, however sub-regional union through the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) or Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) represents a 
significant obstacle to intra region FDI flows. Alafif explained that if the host 
country is a member of the GCC or AMU, its opportunity to receive more Arab FDI 
decreases due to the intra-preferential treatment between members of the relevant 
sub-regional union. Ekanayake et al. (2009) analysed the intra-regional trade and 
investment flows in the MENA region using the augmented fixed effects gravity 
model and panel data over the period 1980 to 2006. The results show that all the 
gravity model main variables yield their expected signs. The coefficients of per 
capita GDP, population, and distance had expected signs and magnitudes in all 
models estimated which confirms the results of previous studies.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Determinants of Intra-MENA FDI 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
One of the most significant features of FDI flows to MENA region is the growing 
importance of investment within the region (see figure 5.1). Intra-MENA FDI 
inflows on average represent more than one third of the total FDI to the region 
(Chauvin 2013).  In resource-poor countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, 
Morocco and Syria, Intra-MENA FDI flows provide much of the needed capital. 
Potential growth of investment within the MENA region is considered very 
important given the fact that most MENA countries are geographically and 
culturally linked.  Driven by the massive surpluses in oil exporting countries during 
the last decade, intra-MENA FDI has been and is likely to continue to be one of the 
main sources of investment in the region. This surge in oil prices since the late 
1990s and the growing accumulated revenues has encouraged local investors in 
MENA rich oil exporting countries to take advantages of proximity in terms of the 
geographical, cultural and institutional distance and invest within the region.  
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Figure 5.1. Intra-MENA FDI in percentage of total FDI from the World to MENA 
 
Source: MENA-OECD Investment Programme 
 
This growth in intra-MENA FDI has been also driven by other important factors 
such as opportunities for privatization and infrastructure development projects in 
the region. For instance, some of the largest FDI projects in the last decade within 
the MENA region have been offered by countries such as Tunisia, Morocco and 
Egypt to invest locally in telecommunications and transportation sectors.  Likewise, 
capital investments within the region have been also exploited through different 
form of portfolio investment.  These include a wide range of (typically) Arab gulf 
based investment funds that are active in infrastructure, energy or real estate 
projects (see, Globalization and Regional Integration in the Arab Countries, 
UNCTAD 2008). 
In the literature on FDI determinants, there are only few studies that have 
investigated FDI determinants within MENA region. Most previous empirical 
studies on FDI to the region were conducted on total country FDI inflows. This 
scarcity in the number of studies on intra-MENA FDI is mainly attributed to the 
lack of bilateral FDI data available on MENA countries. However, in recent years, 
data on MENA countries become available for researchers and easily accessible 
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through websites.  The Arab Investment and Export Credit Guarantee Corporation 
is a joint-Arab agency encompassing all Arab countries and provides bilateral FDI 
data between MENA countries.  
The aim of this study is to use such data and investigates empirically what factors 
determine the flow of FDI between MENA countries using a gravity model. The 
use of the gravity model in this study is particularly important because examining 
this question in the context of the gravity model can enhance our understanding 
about the roles played by the geographical factors in explaining the level of FDI 
within the region. Furthermore, the study also aims to investigate the question of 
the whether the determinants of Intra-MENA FDI differ between the resource-poor 
and resource-rich countries. MENA region comprise a set of countries that are 
economically and institutionally diverse, examining this question in the context of 
the gravity model can enhance our understanding about whether the determinants of 
bilateral FDI inflows within the MENA region differ between the two groups of 
countries.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data 
and variables used in this study. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the specification and 
estimations of the gravity model. Sections 5 and 6 present the empirical results and 
conclusion.  
5.2. Data and Variables  
The FDI data used in this study is a bilateral FDI inflow between MENA countries 
during the period 1998-2011. The countries sample included in this study consists 
of 17 home (sender) countries, namely Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, 
 90 
 
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, 
Tunisia, UAE, Yemen, and 15 host (recipient) countries, which are the same home 
countries exclude Iraq and Kuwait. The total number of observations is 3360 
(16x15x14). Table 5.1 provides information about the variables used in this study, 
their data sources and their expected signs. 
Table 5.1. Description of the variables, sources and their expected signs  
Name of the 
variable Description Data source 
Expected 
sign 
LN FDI The log of FDI inflows in Millions of US$ at current prices. 
The Arab Investment and 
Export Credit Guarantee 
Corporation website 
Dependent 
Variable 
LN GDPi  
The log of GDP of the home 
country at purchasing power 
parity and in current US$.  
World Bank Development 
Indicators + 
LN GDPj 
The log of GDP of the host 
country at purchasing power 
parity and in current US$. 
World Bank Development 
Indicators + 
LN WDISTij 
The log of weighted geographical 
distance between capital cities of 
the home and host countries. 
CEPII website - 
CONTIGij 
A dummy variable equal to one if 
the home and host countries share 
same border or zero otherwise. 
CEPII website + 
COMLANG20ij 
A dummy variable equal to one if 
the home and host countries share 
same second language (spoken by 
20% of the country’ population) 
or zero otherwise. 
CEPII website + 
BITSij 
A dummy variable equal to one if 
the home and host country have 
bilateral investment treaties 
agreements or zero otherwise. 
UNCTAD website + 
NATEXPj 
The percentage of fuel and ores 
exports in the host country’ total 
exports. 
World Bank Development 
Indicators - 
INFLACPIj 
Annual percentage change in the 
consumer price index of the host 
country. 
World Bank Development 
Indicators - 
TRADEj 
The sum of exports and imports 
of the host country divided by the 
value of GDP, all in current US$. 
World Bank Development 
Indicators + 
LN INTERNETj The log of internet users per 100 peoples of the host country. 
World Bank Development 
Indicators + 
INSTITj 
A composed index of the six 
world governance indicators of 
the host country. 
World Bank Governance 
Indicators + 
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Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. The 
average value of the log of FDI is 5.45 percent and its standard deviation is 7.80 
percent. Natural resource and openness to trade are the variables with the highest 
mean and standard deviation among the independent variables. The average value 
of natural resource is 53.49 percent and its standard deviation is 37.96 percent. The 
average value of openness to trade as percentage of GDP is 79.24 percent and its 
standard deviation is 35.45 percent.  
Table 5.2. Data descriptive statistics  
variable Mean St.Deviation Minimum Maximum Obs 
LN FDI 5.45 7.80 0 24.05 3360 
LN GDPi 23.25 5.52 22.54 27.23 3360 
LN GDPj 23.76 4.20 22.54 27.23 3360 
LN WDISTij 7.56 0.75 4.88 8.75 3360 
CONTIGij 0.16 0.37 0 1 3360 
COMLANG20ij 0.07 0.25 0 1 3360 
BITSij 0.35 0.48 0 1 3360 
NATEXPj 53.93 37.97 0 98.63 3360 
INFLACPIj 3.89 4.93 -9.80 22.11 3360 
TRADEj 79.24 35.45 0 175.96 3360 
LN INTERNETj 1.71 1.94 -5.34 4.46 3360 
INSTITj 5.27 1.02 -2.01 1.86 3360 
 
Table 5.3 presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in this study. As can 
be seen from the table, the correlations between the variables in our sample do not 
cause any serious multicollinearity problem. The highest level of correlations is 
between trade and institutions (0.60 percent). As primarily results, FDI positively 
correlated with the GDPs of the home and host countries, common borders and 
bilateral investment treaties dummies, inflation, and negatively to the variables 
distance, the natural resource, trade, internet users and institutions.  
 
 
 92 
 
Table 5.3. Correlation Matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) 1            
(2) 0.06* 1           
(3) 0.10* -0.02 1          
(4) -0.15* 0.04* 0.04* 1         
(5) 0.16* 0.00 0.01 -0.44* 1        
(6) 0.06* 0.06* 0.05* -0.10* 0.07* 1       
(7) 0.07* 0.06* -0.03 0.13* -0.17* 0.08* 1      
(8) -0.05* 0.01 0.10* -0.02 0.06* -0.15* -0.19* 1     
(9) 0.09* 0.03* -0.12* 0.04* -0.02 -0.05* 0.08* 0.24* 1    
(10) -0.07* 0.04* 0.18* -0.14* -0.04* -0.04* 0.02 -0.09* -0.19* 1   
(11) -0.05* 0.05* 0.01 -0.11* -0.01 0.01 0.17* -0.06* -0.05* 0.42* 1  
(12) -0.14* -0.01 0.21* -0.14* -0.03* 0.01 0.00 -0.11* -0.38* 0.60* 0.50* 1 
Note: *Indicate significant at 5%. (1) LN FDI (2) LN GDPi (3) LN GDPj (4) LN WDISTij (5) CONTIGij (6) 
COMLANG20ij (7) BITSij (8) NATEXPj (9) INFLACPIj (10) TRADEj(11) LN INTERNETj (12) INSTITj.  
 
The dependent variable used in this study is bilateral FDI inflows in millions of 
US$. The description of the independent variables summarised in the following 
section (I refer to chapter three for a wider review on the related literature and the 
variables use).  
1. Economic size: In the literature on gravity model, the GDPs of both home and host 
country is often incorporated in the model as proxy for the effects of economic size 
on FDI between them (e.g. Helpman and Krugman 1985; Bergstrand 1990; 
Anderson and Van Wincoop 2003; Grosse and Trevino 1996; Bénassy-Quéré et al. 
2007). The GDP of the home country present the potential of the home country to 
invest in the host country (push factor), while the GDP of the host country present 
the capacity of the host country to absorb these investments (pull factor). In this 
study, we follow the gravity model literature and assess for the effect of economic 
size on FDI using GDPs of the home and the host countries in US$ and at 
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purchasing power parity basis. The expected effect of economic size of both home 
and host country on FDI between MENA countries is to be positive  
 
2. Geographical and cultural distance: The effects of geographical and cultural 
factors on FDI are frequently used in the literature on gravity model. The increase 
in the physical and cultural distance between countries tends to increase the cost of 
transport and information between them. In this study, we use a weighted measure 
of physical distance as provided by the CEPII7 database. This measure of physical 
distance is based on the bilateral distances in KM between the biggest cities in the 
home and host country, the inter-city distances being weighted by the share of the 
city in the overall country’s population. Also, we test for the importance of other 
related geographical and cultural factors, such as common borders and common 
language (French and English being spoken by at least 20% of the total population). 
The effect of each factor investigated using a dummy variable equal to one if both 
countries share the same borders, language or zero otherwise. The expected effect 
of physical distance on FDI is negative while the expected effects of common 
borders and language are to be positive. 
 
3. Bilateral investment treaties: The effect of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on 
FDI has been widely investigated in FDI literature for both developing and 
developed countries (e.g. Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004; Neumayer and Spess 2005; 
Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2006). The majority of these studies confirm the 
positive effect of BITs on FDI. The increase of FDI between countries through 
BITs is a common goal for most policy makers in developing countries. The 
                                                          
7 CEPII is a French research centre.  
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existence of BITs between countries helps to protect private investment in the 
partner countries and also supports the development of international law standards. 
Most MENA countries have signed BITs between them; however, most of these 
agreements have been signed with non-oil exporting countries. Empirical studies on 
the effect of BITs on FDI to MENA countries are very limited. To the best of our 
knowledge, there are only two studies that have looked to the effect of BITs on FDI 
in MENA region (Mina 2010; Laabas and Abdmoulah 2008). In this study, we test 
for the effect of BITs on FDI using a dummy variable equal to one if both home 
and host country have a BITs agreement signed and entered into force at particular 
year or zero otherwise. The expected effect of BITs on FDI is to be positive. 
 
 
4. Natural resource endowment: The availability of natural resources considered to 
be one of most important location advantages that characterise the MENA region. 
However, MENA region comprise set of countries that economically diverse, and 
those resource poorer countries may be more successful in attracting FDI than 
resource rich countries can do. Since the resource curse literature documents 
adverse effects of natural resources on growth performance, one might expect a 
negative effect of natural resource endowments on non-resource FDI, (van der 
Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009).  In this study, we assess for the effect of natural 
resource on FDI to in the host country using the share of the share of minerals and 
oil in total host country’ exports as a measure of natural resource availability. The 
expected effect of natural resource on FDI is to be negative. 
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5. Macroeconomic instability: Inflation rate is commonly used as a proxy for the 
level of macroeconomic instability. High inflation and volatile inflation increases 
uncertainty and thus, leads to higher investment risk. Therefore, FDI will be 
discouraged by such conditions, (see Asiedu 2002; Onyeiwu 2003; Jallab et al. 
2008; Mohamed and Sidiropoulos 2010). In this study, we assess for the effect of 
macroeconomic instability on FDI to the host country using the percentage change 
in the consumer price index (CPI). The expected effect of macroeconomic 
instability on FDI is to be negative. 
 
6. Openness to trade: Theoretically, the relationship between openness to trade and 
FDI depends on whether FDI and trade are complements or substitutes. In the 
empirical literature on FDI determinants, recent evidence on the effect of trade on 
FDI in developing countries emphasise the importance of openness to international 
trade in attracting FDI, (Asiedu 2002; Sekat and Varoudakis 2004; Onyeiwu 2006; 
2008; Mina 2007). In this study, we investigate the effect of openness to trade on 
FDI to the host country using trade as a share of GDP (the sum of the host country’ 
exports and imports divided by the value of GDP). The expected effect of openness 
to international trade on FDI is to be positive. 
 
 
7. Quality of infrastructure: The effect of quality of infrastructure on FDI is widely 
investigated in the literature of FDI determinants and their impacts shown to be 
important especially for developing countries (e.g. Wheeler and Mody 1992; Cheng 
and Kwan 2000; Asiedu 2002). However, in the case of MENA region, there is 
limited number of studies that have investigate their effect on FDI and the empirical 
evidence about their impact on FDI still ambiguous.  For instance, Onyeiwu (2003) 
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investigates FDI determinants to MENA and developing countries and found that 
infrastructure have a positive significant impact on FDI to developing countries but 
not for MENA countries. Abdalmoulah and Laabas (2007) investigate FDI 
determinants between MENA countries using a gravity model and found that 
infrastructure have a negative significant impact of FDI.  In this study, we assess for 
the effect of infrastructure on FDI to the host country using the log of internet users 
per 100 people as proxy for the availability of better quality of infrastructure. The 
expected effect of infrastructure on FDI is to be positive. 
 
8. Quality of institutions: Poor quality institutions impose additional costs for FDI, 
such as the cost of dealing with corruption, bribes, excessive regulations, weak 
enforcement of law and also the low protection of property rights. Empirical 
evidence from the literature on FDI determinants show that the quality of 
institutions in the host country can indeed deter or promote their share of FDI 
(Wheeler and Mody 1992; Wei 1997; Globerman and Shapiro 2002; Bénassy-
Quéré et al. 2007). There are a number of studies that have investigated FDI 
determinants in MENA region; however, there were only few of these studies that 
have extend their analysis by including the institutional effect. The World Bank 
Governance Indicators considered as a valuable source of institutional data.  The 
correlations among these variables are very high because of a common underlying 
dimension. Therefore, constructing composed index of these variables can capture 
the overall effects of quality of institutions. In this study, we employ factor analysis 
technic and create a new variable called institutions to assess for the effect of the 
overall quality of institutions on FDI between MENA countries. The expected 
effect of quality of institutions on FDI is to be positive.  
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5.3. Specifications of the Gravity Model 
 
In recent years, the gravity model has become one of the most successful analytical 
tools for estimating bilateral trade and FDI relations. Also, the use of panel 
econometric methods in estimating the gravity model has become popular in this 
field of research (see chapter four for more detailed review). An important 
advantage of using panel models is reducing the possibility of obtaining biased 
results (see Baltagi 2001). Matyas (1997) argued that the correct gravity 
specification is a three-way model. One dimension is time (reflecting the common 
business cycle) and the other two dimensions of group variables are time invariant 
export and import country effects.  
In this study, we use a similar gravity specification to the one introduced by Matyas 
(1997) and control for the heterogeneity between countries in our sample using 
dummy variables for both sending and receiving countries. Implementing fixed 
effects using dummy variables enable us to assess the effects of time invariant 
variables (variables of interest) such as physical distance and common borders. The 
specification of the gravity model used in this study is outlined as follows: 
 ln 𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑗𝑡  + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗+ 𝛽5𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔20𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽6𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡+ 𝛽9𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡+𝛽10𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑗 + 𝛽11𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛾𝑗+ 𝜃𝑡+𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡        
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Where: 𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the log of FDI flows in millions of US$ from country i (home) 
to country j (host) at time t, 𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the log of the GDP at purchasing power 
parity and in millions of US$ of country i at time t, 𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑗𝑡 is the log of GDP at 
purchasing power parity and in millions of US$ of country j at time t, 𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 is 
the log of geographical weighted distance in KM between the capital cities of 
countries i and j, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 is a dummy equal to one if countries i and j share the 
same borders or zero otherwise, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔20𝑖𝑗  is a dummy equal to one if 
countries  i and j share the same second language or zero otherwise, 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a 
dummy equal to one if countries i and j have a bilateral investment treaty 
agreements entered into force at time t or zero otherwise, 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑗𝑡 is the share of 
minerals and oil in total country’ j exports, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the inflation rate (defined 
as the percentage of change in the consumer price index) in country j at time t, 
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the percentage of trade (as a share of GDP) of country j at time t, 
𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑗 is the log of internet users per 100 people of country j at time t,  
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑗𝑡 is the score of the composed index of the six world governance indicators 
of country j at time t,  𝛼𝑖 is a dummy for country i,  𝛾𝑗 is a dummy for country j, 𝜃𝑡 
is a dummy for time effect and  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is disturbance term. 
 
5.4. Estimations of the Gravity Model 
 
The econometric specification of the gravity model plays an important role in 
determining the country-pairs specific effects on FDI. This is because an 
econometrically mis-specified gravity model can lead to biased estimates and an 
incorrect inference regarding the determinants of FDI. In the literature on FDI 
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determinants, there are several econometric methods that have been introduced in 
order to account for the heterogeneity between countries. However, many of these 
empirical specifications are likely to be biased due to omitted variable problems. In 
recent years, economists sought to address the problem of heterogeneity across 
countries in a panel gravity model by introducing several econometric models as 
the proper specification. (see chapter 3 for more detailed review).  
The use of the ordinary least square (OLS) estimator assumes non-zero FDI flows 
between all pairs of countries, which is not the true case in practice as some country 
pairs do not exchange FDI with each other at all. The traditional way of handling 
such a problem is to delete all zero value in the dataset, or set these zeroes to be 
equal to a very small value that enables the log of the observations to be taken, 
(Linnemann 1966). However, the use of these techniques as a means of estimating 
the gravity model can severely bias the empirical results and lead to incorrect 
inferences. Especially when it comes to estimating the geographical and culture 
effects, omitting zeroes tends to reduce the estimated effects of these variables. 
Also, the added value of one constant can overestimate these effects and produce 
highly significant effects. To overcome this problematic flaw and also check for the 
validity of our results, we estimate the gravity model using to two different 
estimators, the ordinary least square (OLS) and the Probit. In the first estimation of 
the gravity model using OLS, we correct for the problem of missing values in FDI 
by taking the log of FDI plus one as a way of dealing with zeros. In the second 
estimation of the gravity model, we use the Probit estimator to predict for the 
missing value on FDI. 
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5.5. Empirical Results  
 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present the regression results obtained from the panel fixed 
effects OLS and Probit gravity model estimated for MENA countries during the 
period 1998-2011. Columns 1 and 2 in each table present the regression results for 
the full sample of MENA countries, while columns 3 and 4 present the regression 
results for the sub-samples of MENA resource-poor and resource-rich countries 
respectively.  
In order to check for the goodness of fit of the regressions produced by the OLS 
and Probit  gravity model, we follow the Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) steps 
and conduct the misspecification RESET test (Ramsey 1969).The test is simply 
conducted by testing the significance of the additional regressor constructed as 
(xb)^2, where b is the vector of estimated parameters8.The RESET tests results 
reported at the bottom of each table indicate that the Probit gravity model 
performed better than the OLS gravity model in explaining the variation in FDI. 
Accordingly, the p-values of the RESET test indicates that the hypothesis of the 
coefficient on the test variable (xb^2) is equal to zero (no omitted variables) is 
accepted in all the Probit gravity regressions only. However, we find no differences 
in the results in term of the corresponding signs and the significance of the 
explanatory variables in both models. The only difference in the results produced 
by the two models is that (as Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) mentioned in his 
paper) OLS tend to exaggerate the impacts of the estimated coefficients of the 
                                                          
8 Ramsey’s RESET test of functional misspecification is intended to provide a simple indicator of evidence of 
nonlinearity.  To implement it, one runs the regression and saves the fitted values of the dependent variable. Then, 
one adds the square of the fitted value to the regression specification and tests for the coefficient. If the t statistic 
for the coefficient is significant, this indicates that some kind of nonlinearity may be present. 
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variables. As can be seen form the results presented in each table the magnitude of 
the coefficients impact on FDI is larger for the OLS gravity model but it indicates 
same sings with the Probit gravity model. 
We begin our empirical analysis by exploring the performance of Intra-MENA FDI 
in the context of the gravity model. Column 1 in each table presents the result from 
the basic gravity model estimated for the full sample of MENA countries with fixed 
effects included in the model. The fixed effects implemented using dummies 
encoded for the year of FDI; sender country and receiver country (see Matyas 
1997). Panel fixed effects regression model produce more robust results than 
pooled regression model as it takes into account the differences in the panel data 
structure and control for the unobserved heterogeneity between the host and home 
countries. 
 The results from the basic gravity model indicate that most of the traditional 
gravity variables are significant and carry the expected signs.  The GDPs of both 
home and host countries have a positive and significant impact on bilateral FDI 
whereas geographic distance shows to have a negative impact on FDI. The effects 
of other gravity relevant factors such as common border, language and bilateral 
investment treaties dummies also show to have a positive and significant impact on 
FDI.  
Column 2 presents the regression results from the augmented gravity model in 
which a set of economic and institutional variables added to the model. The results 
confirm the importance of the economic and institutional variables in explaining the 
variation in FDI between MENA countries. The effects of natural resource, the 
availability of better quality of infrastructure, openness to international trade and 
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lower level of macroeconomic instability all found to be significant and contribute 
positively to the increase in the inflow of FDI within the MENA region. The results 
also indicate that FDI between MENA countries is negatively associated with 
quality of institutions in the host country. This finding can be true in the context of 
MENA region as most of FDI inflows in the region occurs between countries with 
low quality of institutions. Investors in the MENA region seem to see no potential 
risk in investing in other country in the region because they work in similar 
business environment conditions at home country.  
 In order to assess for the hypothesis of whether the difference in the economic 
structure between MENA countries imply a difference in the level of FDI received 
by resource-rich and resource-poor countries, we estimate a dummy variable equal 
to one if a host country is resource-rich country or zero otherwise. A positive and 
significant coefficient on this variable implies that the MENA resource-rich 
countries receive more FDI compared to others, while a negative and significant 
coefficient implies the opposite. The results shows that the estimated coefficient on 
MENA resource-rich countries dummy is negative and statistically significant 
indicating that, if all the values of the explanatory variables are the same for both 
group of countries, MENA resource-rich countries would receive less FDI 
compared to resource-poor countries.  
To answer the question of whether our explanatory variables affect MENA 
resource-rich and resource-poor differently, we estimate a separate regression for 
each group of countries. As can be seen from the regressions presented in columns 
3 and 4, there are significant differences in the results estimated for the two groups 
of countries in term of the overall performance of the gravity model and also in 
term of the sign and significant of the estimated coefficients of the variables. First, 
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the overall performance of the gravity model as indicated by the R square is higher 
for resource poor-countries compared to resource-rich countries indicating that our 
variables explain high proportion in the variation of FDI to the MENA resource-
poor countries. Second, the estimated coefficients on the variables of the gravity 
model show to have larger impacts on FDI flows to resource-poor countries 
compared to resource-rich country. Third, the effect of natural resource and 
institutions on FDI to resource-rich countries is the opposite of their effects on FDI 
to resource-poor countries. Accordingly, the effects of natural resource found to be 
negative and significant on FDI to resource-poor countries while its effect found to 
be positive and significant for resource-rich country. In contrast, the effect of 
institutions found to be positive on FDI to resource-poor countries while its effect 
found to be negative for resource-rich countries, but statistically insignificant for 
both groups of countries. Our results in this regard have an important implication 
about the adverse effect of resource curse on FDI between MENA countries. 
MENA resource-poor countries have been more successful in attracting FDI than 
resource-rich countries.  
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Table 5.4.  Panel OLS fixed effects gravity model results 1998-2011 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 3.007 (1.30) 
5.681** 
(2.56) 
194.289** 
(2.57) 
6.826** 
(2.18) 
LN GDPi 0.027* (1.14) 
0.027 
(1.14) 
0.080* 
(1.79) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
LN GDPj 0.074*** (2.88) 
0.040 
(1.34) 
-6.466** 
(-2.23) 
-0.002 
(-0.07) 
LN WDISTij -0.776*** (-3.46) 
-0.766*** 
(-3.44) 
-2.506*** 
(5.28) 
-0.933*** 
(-3.23) 
CONTIGij 1.994*** (4.65) 
1.990*** 
(4.70) 
4.372*** 
(5.49) 
1.186** 
(2.35) 
COMLANG20ij 0.810* (1.59) 
0.803 
(1.58) 
1.304** 
(2.14) 
-1.034 
(-0.80) 
BITSij 0.907*** (3.05) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.786*** 
(2.64) 
1.388*** 
(2.70) 
0.732** 
(2.01) 
NATEXPj 0.013** (2.45) 
-0.154** 
(-2.55) 
0.018*** 
(3.13) 
INFLACPIj -0.137*** (-3.66) 
-0.130 
(-1.34) 
-0.152*** 
(-3.58) 
TRADEj  0.018*** (2.83) 
-0.133*** 
(3.22) 
0.019*** 
(2.72) 
LN INTERNETj  0.818*** (4.70) 
1.631*** 
(4.46) 
0.677*** 
(3.40) 
INSTITj  -2.066*** (-3.27) 
2.302 
(1.34) 
-1.571 
(-1.85) 
NATEXP DUMMYj  -3.49*** (-2.69) 
  
R-SQUARE 0.36 0.35 0.46 0.31 
F-STATISTIC 56.43 49.90 45.84 23.95 
RESET TEST P-VALUES 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
3360 3360 1120 2240 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 5.5.  Panel Probit fixed effects gravity model results 1998-2011 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -0.391 (-0.67) 
0.567 
(0.96) 
54.395*** 
(2.78) 
0.911 
(1.09) 
LN GDPi 0.002* (1.22) 
0.002 
(1.24) 
0.006 
(1.53) 
0.000 
(0.27) 
LN GDPj 0.009*** (3.58) 
0.006** 
(2.26) 
-0.770*** 
(-2.60) 
0.002 
(1.22) 
LN WDISTij -0.102*** (-5.87) 
-0.102*** 
(-5.92) 
-0.247*** 
(-5.67) 
-0.096*** 
(-5.27) 
CONTIGij  0.124*** (3.76) 
0.124*** 
(3.76) 
0.386*** 
(6.04) 
0.043 
(1.40) 
COMLANG20ij 0.071* (1.68) 
0.071* 
(1.68) 
0.120* 
(1.83) 
-0.042 
(-0.77) 
 BITSij  0.062** (2.47) 
0.053** 
(2.11) 
0.140*** 
(2.59) 
0.032 
(1.17) 
NATEXPj  0.001*** (3.00) 
-0.013** 
(-2.30) 
0.001*** 
(3.30) 
INFLACPIj  -0.008*** (-3.01) 
-0.014 
(-1.49) 
-0.005* 
(-1.94) 
TRADEj   0.002*** (3.54) 
-0.012*** 
(-2.80) 
0.001*** 
(3.27) 
LN INTERNETj   0.062*** (4.69) 
0.132*** 
(3.39) 
0.055*** 
(4.41) 
INSTITj  -0.138*** (-2.80) 
0.272 
(1.58) 
-0.562 
(-1.06) 
NATEXP DUMMYj  -0.420*** (-4.42) 
  
R-SQUARE  0.32 0.33 0.38 0.32 
F-STATISTIC 810.48 910.98 391.50 545.67 
RESET TEST P-VALUES 0.11 0.27 0.17 0.26 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
3360 3360 1120 2240 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses ***, **, * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
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5.6. Conclusion 
  
This chapter investigates the determinants of bilateral FDI between MENA countries using 
a panel fixed effects gravity model during the period 1998-2011. The results from the basic 
gravity model indicate that FDI between MENA countries positively driven by the 
economic sizes of both home and host countries and negatively by the physical distance 
between them. The results also indicate that the roles played by common borders and 
bilateral investment treaties are particularly relevant and their effects shown to be highly 
significant, suggesting that bilateral FDI flows tend to be larger between neighbours, 
having already well-established investment treaties agreements. Our results from the 
augmented gravity model confirm the importance of economic and institutional factors in 
explaining the variation in FDI between MENA countries. The effects of better quality of 
infrastructure, openness to international trade, low level of macroeconomic instability all 
found to be important and contribute positively to the increase of FDI between MENA 
countries. The results also indicate that Intra-MENA FDI inflows and its determinants 
differ between resource-poor and resource-rich countries in the region. Accordingly, 
resource-poor countries have been more successful in attracting FDI compared to resource-
rich countries. A dummy variable for resource-rich countries indicates the disadvantage of 
these countries in receiving FDI compared to resource-poor countries. The results also 
suggest that the effect of natural resource and institutions on FDI differ among MENA 
countries according to the difference in their economic structure. FDI to the resource-poor 
countries found to responds negatively to the availability of natural resource, and 
positively to the quality of institutions, opposite to the case of the resource-rich countries. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Determinants of FDI to MENA and 
Developing Countries:  A comparative 
Analysis 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter investigates FDI determinants in MENA countries compared to FDI 
determinants in developing countries over the period 1996-2011. The results 
indicate that a MENA country receive on average 1.21 percent less FDI than a non-
MENA country, and  that the natural resources have a direct negative effect on FDI 
to MENA countries even after controlling for the necessary factors for both MENA 
and developing countries. The results also indicate that the marginal effects of 
return on investment, quality of infrastructure, macroeconomic instability and the 
interaction between natural resource and institutions on FDI is less for MENA 
countries compared to developing countries. Our result regarding the effect of the 
quality of institutions on FDI to MENA countries have an important implication for 
policy maker in the region. The suggestion following this finding is that an 
improvement in the quality of institutions will be beneficial to MENA countries in 
general, but more beneficial to the resource-rich countries.   
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6.2. World FDI Trend and Distribution  
 
 
Global FDI flows have dramatically increased in the past three decades and reached 
an estimated 1,244 billion dollars in 2010.  According to the World Investment 
Report (2011), for the first time since 1980, developing and transition economies 
together attracted more than half of the global FDI flows (see Figure 6.1). Also, as 
more international production moves to developing and transition economies, 
multinational companies are increasingly investing in those countries to maintain 
cost-effectiveness and to remain competitive in the global production network.  
 
Figure 6.1. FDI inflows by group of economies, 1980-2010 (Billions of US$) 
 
Source: World Investment Report (2011). 
 
 
Table 6.1 shows that the share of developing countries in the world FDI inflows has 
rapidly increased from 38% to 45% over the period from 1996 to 2010. The 
countries that make up Asia are the largest FDI recipients among the developing 
countries. Asia’s share in the world FDI inflows by the end of the year 2010 had 
reached 28%, followed by Latin America with 13%, MENA 5.5% and then Africa 
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3%. Although MENA countries’ share in the world total FDI inflows was 1.5% in 
1996 and it has increased ever since to reach 5.5% in 2010, its share at the global 
level remains relatively below the share level recorded in other developing 
countries in Asia and Latin America. 
 Table: 6.1. World total FDI inflows at current prices and in Billions of US$ 
Region 1996 
As % of the 
world total 
FDI inflows 
2010 
As % of the 
world total 
FDI inflows 
World $391,439 100 % $1,408,537 100 % 
Developing countries $149,536 38 % $637,063 45 % 
Developed countries $236,032 60 % $696,418 49 % 
Countries of Africa $6,298 1.6 % $43,582 3 % 
Countries of Latin America $46,248 12% $189,855 13 % 
Countries of Asia $96,873 25% $400,687 28 % 
Countries of MENA $5,668 1.5 % $76,751 5.5% 
Source: UNCTAD Database. 
These differences in the share of FDI flows between developing countries have 
raised the question of why some developing countries in Asia and Latin America 
are more successful in attracting FDI than other developing countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa and the MENA region. In order to explain these differences in the 
flow of FDI to developing countries, some economists pointed to the role played 
out by the economic and institutional factors in these countries. 
Asiedu (2002) uses a sample of 72 developing countries to examine whether factors 
that affect FDI in developing countries affect countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
differently. The results indicate that a higher return on investment and a better 
quality of infrastructure have positive effects on FDI inflows to developing 
countries, but have no significant effects on the FDI inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa 
countries. Openness to trade promotes FDI to both Sub-Saharan Africa countries 
and developing countries; however, the marginal benefit from increasing openness 
is less for Sub-Saharan Africa countries.  
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Onyeiwu (2003) investigates the same question in the context of MENA countries 
using a panel of 51 developing countries, 10 of which are located in the MENA 
region. The study results show that some of the variables that affect FDI to 
developing countries are not important for FDI to MENA countries. These variables 
are the rate of return on investment, infrastructures, economic growth and inflation. 
The results also indicate that corruption and openness to trade are the most 
determinant factors that can explain the low level of FDI to the MENA region. 
Recently, Mohamed and Sidiropoulos (2010) also investigate the same question in 
their previous studies using a sample of 36 developing countries, in which 12 of 
these countries were in MENA region and another 24 were the major recipients of 
FDI in their respective regions in developing countries. The study concludes that 
FDI key determinants inflows in MENA countries are the size of the host economy, 
the government size, natural resources and the institutional variables. The study 
concludes that, countries that are receiving fewer foreign investments could make 
themselves more attractive to potential foreign investors. 
In the literature on FDI determinants, it has been suggested that countries endowed 
with abundant natural resources (oil and gas in particular) are more likely to 
develop a weak quality of institutions. This is because the exploitation of fuels and 
minerals produces large economic rents. This provides incentives for unproductive 
rent-seeking behaviour involving corruption and, overall, weaker quality of 
institutions (see chapter one for broader discussion).  
Kolstad and Wiig (2013) investigate the question of whether corruption deters or 
attracts FDI in the extractive industry using a sample of 81 developed and 
developing countries over the period from 1996 to 2009. The study results conclude 
that corruption within a country is associated with increased extractive industry 
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FDI, but at a diminishing rate as corruption increases. Asiedu (2013) empirically 
examined the interaction link between FDI, natural resources and institutions using 
panel data of 99 developing countries over the period from 1984 to 2011. The study 
concludes that natural resources have an adverse effect on FDI even after 
controlling the quality of institutions and other important determinants of FDI. The 
results also indicate that good quality institutions can mitigate the adverse effect of 
natural resources; however, these effects cannot be neutralised. 
Our work differs from Onyeiwu (2003) and Mohamed and Sidiropoulos (2010) 
concern FDI determinants to MENA countries compared to developing countries in 
three respects. First, unlike Onyeiwu (2003) work, we include also MENA 
resource-rich countries in our sample and investigate in particular for the effect of 
natural resources on FDI. Second, we include the institutional element in our 
analysis using  composite institutional index that reflect several characteristics of a 
country’s overall quality of institutions, such as the voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, regularity quality, rule of law and level of corruption. 
Third, we investigate the link between natural resource and institutions and their 
interaction effect on FDI to MENA countries compared to developing countries. 
Investigating the effect of the interaction between natural resource and institution 
on FDI to MENA countries in comparison to developing countries is particular 
important for policy makers in the MENA region considering the fact that most of 
MENA countries are resource-rich countries that have already weak quality of 
institutions and are in need for FDI.   
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6.3. Data and Variables 
The data used in this study is a panel data cover the period 1996-2011. The sample 
of countries included in this analysis comprises 72 developing countries, of which 
15 are located in the MENA region. The choice of countries and the time period of 
this analysis are determined by the availability of data on the variables of interest. 
All data used in this study were obtained from the World Bank Development 
Indicators database.9 The sample of countries included in this study are (1) MENA: 
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Yemen, 
(2) Sub-Saharan Africa: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Uganda and Zimbabwe (3) Latin 
America: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela (4) South Asia: Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam. 
As a starting point in the process of the variables selection, we check for the 
presence of outliers in the full sample regression. The presence of outliers can 
significantly change the magnitude and the signs of the estimated coefficients, 
which sometimes can lead to inappropriate inferences (Seung-Whan Choi 2009). A 
                                                          
9 Dataset last updated on 17 January 2014. 
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plot of the residuals against the fitted values in our regression indicates that there 
are a few countries with some influential observation that lie far away from the 
main cluster of the data. These countries are Lebanon, Sudan, Mozambique, 
Singapore and Malaysia. The decision to exclude these countries form the full 
sample is essential because of their influential effects on the magnitude and the 
signs of the explanatory variables.   
The definition of the dependent and independent variables, their resource and their 
expected signs are described in table 6.2.  
Table 6.2. Definitions of the variables, sources and their expected signs 
variable Discerption Data resource Expected sign 
 FDI/GDP The net of FDI as percentage of the host country’s GDP 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators 
Dependent 
Variable 
ROI The log of the inverse of the real GDP per capita PPP in current US$ 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators 
+ 
INFRA 
A composed index of various 
infrastructure indicators, namely, 
Telephone lines (per 100people), 
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 
people), Internet users (per 100 people), 
Air transport, freight (million ton-km), 
Air transport, passengers carried, 
Roads, total network (km), Roads, and 
passengers carried (million passenger-
km). 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators 
+ 
TRADE 
The sum of exports and imports of 
goods and services measured as a share 
of the host country’ GDP. 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators 
+ 
INSTIT 
A composed index of the six world 
governance indicators, namely, voice 
and accountability, government 
effectiveness, regularity quality, rule of 
law and control of corruption (estimated 
values) 
World Bank 
Governance 
Indicators 
+ 
NATEXP 
The sum of the share of fuel and 
minerals in the total host country’ 
exports. 
World Bank 
Governance 
Indicators 
- 
INFLACPI Annual percentage change in the consumer price index. 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators 
- 
MENA 
A dummy variable equal to one if a 
country is a MENA country or zero 
otherwise. 
Constructed 
Manually + 
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Table 6.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. As 
can be seen for this table, openness to trade, availability of natural resources and the 
level of macroeconomic instability are the variables with the highest mean and 
standard deviation among all variables. Table (4) presents the pairwise correlations 
and the level of significance between the variables used in this study. As 
preliminary results, the correlation matrix gives an important indications about the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables used in this study. 
Accordingly, our dependent variable FDI/GDP is positively correlated with the 
variables of infrastructure, openness to trade, institutions and negatively with the 
variables of return on investment, the availability of natural resources, the level of 
macroeconomic instability and the MENA region dummy. 
 
Table 6.3. Data descriptive statistics  
VARIABLES Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs 
FDIGDP 3.01 3.22 -8.59 33.57 1152 
ROI -7.40 1.37 -11.42 -4.70 1152 
INFRA -0.10 0.89 -0.82 8.36 1152 
TRADE 73.76 36.85 14.93 562.06 1152 
INSTIT 0.03 0.87 -1.87 2.59 1152 
INFLACPI 33.42 769.24 -9.80 24411.03 1152 
NATEXP 30.43 32.55 0 99.67 1152 
MENA 0.16 0.37 0 1 1152 
 
Table 6.4. Correlation Matrix  
VARIABLES FDIGDP ROI INFRA TRADE INSTIT INFLACPI NATEXP MENA 
FDIGDP 1        
ROI -0.20* 1       
INFRA 0.15* -0.58* 1      
TRADE 0.35* -0.32* 0.13* 1     
INSTIT 0.30* -0.61* 0.29* 0.27* 1    
INFLACPI -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.08* 1   
NATEXP -0.07* -0.42* 0.10* 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 1  
MENA -0.11* -0.47* 0.16* 0.13* 0.09* -0.02 0.66* 1 
*Indicate significant at 5% level of confidence 
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6.4. Model Specification 
To empirically investigate the difference in FDI inflows and determinants between 
MENA and developing countries, we estimate a pooled OLS regression for the full 
sample of MENA and developing countries with countries and time fixed effects 
included in the model. The specification of the regression model used in this study 
can be outline as following: 
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0+𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑁𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
Where 𝐹𝐷𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the net of FDI inflows as percentage of the host country’ GDP. 
  𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑖𝑡  is the log of the inverse of the host country’ real GDP per capita PPP.  
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 is a composed index of various infrastructure indicators. 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 is the sum of exports and imports divided by the host country’ GDP 
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 is a composed index of the six world governance indicators  
𝑁𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the sum of the share of fuel and minerals in the total host country’ exports 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 is the annual percentage change in the consumer price index 
𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 is a dummy equal one if a country is a MENA country or zero otherwise. 
𝜃𝑡 present is a dummy for the country-specific effects 
𝛾𝑡 present is a dummy for the time-specific effects 
𝜀𝑡 present is the error term 
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6.5. Empirical Results  
Table 6.5 reports the results obtained using a pooled OLS regression estimated for 
the full sample of MENA and developing countries over the period 1996-2011. 
Columns 1- 4 report the cross section regression results where the data averaged over 
the 16 years. Columns 5 and 6 report the panel data regression results over the same 
period. As start in our regressions, we consider only the significant variables for 
MENA and developing countries to see what factors can explain the variation in FDI 
as percentage of their GDPs.  
The results reported in columns 1 indicate that 42% of the variation in FDI to MENA 
and developing countries can be explained by variables, namely, return on 
investment variable (ROI), the availability of infrastructure variable (INFRA), the 
openness to international trade variable (TRADE), the macroeconomic instability 
variable (INFLACPI) and the quality of institutions variables (INSTIT). The results 
indicate that FDI to MENA and developing countries increases with return on 
investment, infrastructure development, openness to trade, better quality of 
institutions, and lower level of macroeconomic instability. In column 2, we include 
the MENA dummy variable (MENA equal one if a country is a MENA country or 
zero otherwise) in our model to see whether MENA countries in average receive less 
FDI compared to other developing countries. The coefficient on the MENA dummy 
measures the difference in the FDI between MENA and developing countries, 
assuming that both groups of countries have the same levels of all the explanatory 
variables. The results reported in column 2 indicate that MENA dummy is negative 
and statistically significant at 5% level of confidence suggesting that, if all the values 
of the explanatory variables were the same for all developing countries, a MENA 
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country will receive about 1.21 percent less FDI than a non-MENA country. The 
inclusion of MENA dummy in the model also contributes to the overall significance 
of the model and increase the adjusted R square from 0.42 to 0.45 percent. This 
suggests that MENA countries as a group of countries have an important regional 
effect on the overall flow of FDI to developing countries. Next, we test for the 
robustness of the model and include the natural resource variable (NATEXP) in the 
model.  
The inclusion of the natural resource variable in our model is particular important as 
one of the aims of this study is to investigate its effects on the ability of MENA 
countries to attract FDI. Columns 3 report the results of the regression after the 
inclusion of the natural resource variable. The results indicate that the effect of the 
natural resource variable are significant and also increase the overall significant of 
the model (as indicated by adjusted R square value) notably from 0.45 to 0.51 
percent. Furthermore, the inclusion of natural resource variable has important 
inference as it increases the negative significant impact of MENA dummy on the FDI 
from 1.21 to 2.15 percent. This suggests that adding the natural resource variable to 
the model worsen the chance of a MENA country in receiving more FDI compared 
to a non-MENA country. Using the regression reported in column 3 as baseline 
model, we test whether the impact of the explanatory variables is the same for 
MENA and non-MENA countries.  
In order to test for this hypothesis, we interacting each of the explanatory variables 
with the MENA dummy. The results reported in column 4 are the regression results 
with interactive terms of MENA dummy included in the model. There are three 
important findings can be observed from this regression results, first, the coefficients 
of the interactive terms between MENA dummy with the variables of return on 
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investment (MENA x ROI), availability of infrastructure (MENA x INFRA), 
availability of natural resource (MENA x NATEXP), macroeconomic instability 
(MENA x INFLACPI) and natural resource and institution (MENA x NATEXP x 
INSTIT) variables are all found to be negatively associated with FDI. This suggests 
that marginal impacts of these variables on FDI are less for MENA countries 
compared to non-MENA countries in our sample.  Second, the coefficient of the 
interactive term of MENA dummy with availability of natural resource (MENA x 
NATEXP) and natural resource with institutions (MENA x NATEXP x INSTIT) are 
the only coefficients stand out to be statistically significant. Third, the coefficients of 
the interactive term of MENA dummy with openness to trade variable (MENA x 
TRADE) and MENA dummy with institutions variable (MENA x INSTIT) are the 
only coefficients that are positively associated with FDI.  
Table 6.6 reports the estimated partial coefficients and their level of significance for 
both MENA and non-MENA countries. Accordingly, all the partial coefficients of 
the explanatory variables estimated for MENA dummy have significant impacts on 
FDI except for the interactive term between natural resource and institutions 
variables (NATEXP x INSTIT). The significance of the partial coefficients estimated 
for MENA dummy interactions with the variables of return on investment, 
availability of infrastructure, openness to trade, quality of institutions, availability of 
natural resources and macroeconomic instability based on the fact (F-test) that I can 
reject the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients for each of these variables 
estimated for MENA dummy and non-MENA countries are equal to zero. Likewise, 
the insignificance of estimated partial coefficient of the interactive term between 
natural resource and institutions (NATEXP x INSTIT)based on the fact that I cannot 
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reject the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients estimated for MENA country 
and  non-MENA countries is equal to zero .  
To check for the robustness of the results produced with the averaged data, we repeat 
the regression reported in columns 4 using a panel OLS regression model. The 
estimation of the panel OLS regression model allow for taking account of the time 
and countries specific effects and therefore, it expected to produce robust results. 
Column 5 reports the results from the panel OLS regression without time and country 
specific effects, while column 6 reports the results when the time and countries 
specific effect are included in the model. The results produced by the pooled OLS 
regression (common intercept and slope for all countries) when we used panel data 
are similar to the results produced when we used averaged data. However, these 
results changed when we control for the country and the time effects (different slop 
and intercept for each country). The effect of return on investment variable on FDI 
becomes positive and statistically significant for developing countries but not for 
MENA countries. Also, the effect of openness to trade on FDI becomes positive and 
statistically significant for MENA countries but not for developing countries. In 
regard to the effect of natural resource and institutions on FDI, the results from the 
fixed effects model show that the effect of natural resource on FDI is negative for 
both MENA and developing countries but statistically significant only for developing 
countries. However, the interaction between natural resource and institutions found 
to be positive but statistically insignificant for developing countries while its effect 
found to be negative and statistically significant for MENA countries. This finding 
gives a clear indication those MENA countries different than other developing 
countries in term of the interactive effect of natural resource and institutions on FDI. 
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Table 6.5. Pooled OLS results for MENA and developing countries 1996-2011 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 4.651*** 
(3.35) 
2.882* 
(1.78) 
4.913*** 
(3.09) 
4.933** 
(2.68) 
2.393*** 
(2.93) 
10.980*** 
(2.82) 
ROI 0.551*** 
(3.02) 
0.283 
(1.31) 
0.657*** 
(3.07) 
0.684*** 
(2.83) 
0.173 
(1.39) 
1.260** 
(2.21) 
INFRA 0.604** 
(2.65) 
0.553** 
(2.52) 
0.740*** 
(3.16) 
0.827*** 
(3.34) 
0.345*** 
(3.47) 
-1.126 
(-0.82) 
TRADE 0.032*** 
(5.80) 
0.032*** 
(6.07) 
0.034*** 
(6.68) 
0.035*** 
(7.04) 
0.023*** 
(3.13) 
-0.002 
(-0.52) 
INFLACPI -0.000** 
(-2.27) 
-0.000*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.000*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.000** 
(-2.23) 
-0.000 
(-0.75) 
-0.000* 
(-1.89) 
INSTIT 0.880*** 
(3.22) 
0.668** 
(2.29) 
1.025*** 
(4.00) 
0.910** 
(2.47) 
0.779*** 
(3.72) 
1.412** 
(2.45) 
MENA  -1.211** 
(-2.08) 
-2.158*** 
(-2.80) 
-4.586 
(-0.32) 
-10.718* 
(-1.79) 
-19.809* 
(-1.73) 
NATEXP   0.023*** 
(3.01) 
0.029*** 
(3.43) 
0.011* 
(1.74) 
-0.036** 
(-2.54) 
NATEXP*INSTIT    0.007 
(1.10) 
0.011* 
(1.90) 
0.010 
(0.61) 
MENA*ROI    -1.300 
(-0.73) 
-1.382* 
(-1.78) 
-0.237 
(-0.21) 
MENA*INFRA    -2.305 
(-1.17) 
-0.495 
(-0.42) 
-0.972 
(-0.80) 
MENA*MTRADE    0.013 
(0.43) 
0.072 
(1.29) 
0.241** 
(2.50) 
MENA*INFLACPI    -0.152 
(-0.51) 
0.048 
(0.98) 
-0.068 
(-0.84) 
MENA*INSTIT    6.315 
(1.38) 
0.917 
(0.23) 
2.519 
(0.74) 
MENA*NATEXP    -0.113** 
(-2.28) 
-0.103** 
(-2.02) 
-0.025 
(-0.50) 
MENA*NATEXP*INSTIT    -0.093* 
(-1.96) 
-0.057** 
(-2.02) 
-0.089* 
(-1.83) 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARE 0.42 0.45 0.51 0.52 0.34 0.50 
NORMALITY TEST P-
VALUE 
0.25 0.10 0.64 0.90 0.00 0.00 
HETEROSKEDASTICITY 
TEST P-VALUE 
0.19 0.20 0.22 0.31 0.00 0.00 
F-STATISTIC 18.66 17.83 19.63 17.60 24.89 22.79 
COUNTRY DUMMY NO NO NO NO NO YES 
YEAR DUMMY NO NO NO NO NO YES 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
72 72 72 72 1152 1152 
Note: *,**,*** indicate significant at 1%,5% and 10% respectively. T-statistics is reported in 
parentheses. Shapiro–Wilk normality test used to detect for the normality of the residuals. Breusch-
Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test used to detect for heteroskedasticity.  
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Table 6.6. Partial effect of the explanatory variables 
Variable MENA COUNTRIES NON-MENA COUNTRIES 
ROI -0.615** 0.684*** 
 
INFRA -1.478*** 0.827*** 
 
TRADE 0.049*** 0.035*** 
 
INFLACPI -0.152* -0.000** 
 
INSTIT 7.225** 0.910** 
 
NATEXP -0.084*** 0.029*** 
NATEXP*INSTIT -0.086 0.007 
 ***, **, * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
 
6.6. Conclusion 
This study has empirically investigated the determinants of FDI to MENA countries 
compared to developing countries over the period 1996-2011. The aim of this study 
was to answer three important questions about FD flows to MENA and developing 
countries: (1) Do MENA countries receive less FDI than other developing countries? 
(2) Do FDI determinants to developing countries affect FDI to MENA countries 
differently? (3) What are the effect of interaction between natural resource and 
institutions on FDI to MENA and developing countries? In order to address the first 
question, we estimate pooled OLS regression that includes both MENA and non-
MENA countries and assess for the impact of MENA countries using dummy 
variable. The results indicate that if all the values of the explanatory variables were 
the same for all developing countries, a MENA country receive 1.21 percent less FDI 
than a non-MENA country. The results also indicate that a MENA country receives 
even less FDI when the natural resource variable added to the model. This finding 
suggests that the availability of natural resource in MENA region has worsened its 
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chance to receive more FDI as much as developing countries. In order to address the 
second question about the differences in FDI determinants between MENA and 
developing countries, we follow Asiedu (2002) steps and interact each of the 
explanatory variables with the MENA dummy. The results indicate that except for 
trade and institutions, all the interactive terms of the MENA dummy with the 
explanatory variables are negatively associated with FDI. This indicates clearly that 
MENA countries on average have less advantage in attracting more FDI in 
comparison to developing countries. Accordingly, higher return on investment, 
availability of natural resource, better quality of infrastructure and institutions 
promotes FDI only to developing countries but not for MENA countries. In order to 
answer the third question, we interact natural resource variable and institutions with 
MENA dummy and check for their effect on FDI.   Our results in this regard suggest 
the interaction between natural resource and institutions have a negative significant 
impact on FDI. This finding is different for developing countries in our sample in 
which the interaction of natural resource and institutions found to be positive. 
 This study has important policy implications for policy makers in MENA region 
about how natural resource abundant countries in the region can avoid the natural 
resource curse. Our results suggest that an improvement in the quality of institutions 
is beneficial for MENA countries and can results to great extend in higher inflows of 
FDI to the region. This recommendation is in particular relevant for MENA resource-
rich countries that have already weak quality of institutions and are in need for FDI.   
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CHAPTER 7 
 
FDI and Performance of Firms in 
MENA Region 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
In recent years, many developing countries sought to attract FDI as a strategy for 
promoting local industries and increasing the productivity and competitiveness of 
domestic firms. The presence of FDI in the host country can transfer many 
advantages (e.g. technology, managerial and labour skills and financial capital) and 
it has also direct and indirect effects on the welfare and development of the host 
country (see chapter one for more discussion about the benefits and costs of FDI). 
The superiority of foreign firms in their performance compared to the performance 
of domestic firms is more evident in the literature of firm-level FDI, and its roots 
can be traced back to the so-called “industrial organization theory”. Accordingly, 
foreign firms are able to compete with domestic firms in their local market because 
foreign firms possess specific advantages such as technological know-how, 
financial capital as well as marketing and managing skills.  
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In the literature on FDI, there are a large number of firm-level FDI studies that have 
investigated the importance of FDI to the development and growth of the host 
country. However, empirical evidence about their effects on the performance of 
domestic firms is mixed. Caves (1974) argues that the entrance of foreign firms into 
the local market is likely to affect the structure of the market in the host country and 
contribute positively to the productivity and competitiveness of the domestic firms. 
This is mainly because the foreign firms bring with it many advantages, including a 
higher level of technical efficiency (crowding-in effect). Aitken and Harrison 
(1999) found that the increases in foreign equity participation is positively 
correlated with the productivity of small firms only, suggesting that small firms 
benefit from the productive advantages of foreign owners. However, an increase in 
foreign ownership negatively affects the productivity of wholly domestically owned 
firms in the same industry (crowding-out effect). The authors explained the 
difference of his results on other studies by the tendency of multinationals MNEs to 
locate in more productive sectors and to invest in more productive firms (I refer to 
chapter 3 for broader discussion).  
In the literature, there is a wide range of studies that have empirically investigated 
the link between firm-level FDI and the performance of firms in many developed 
and developing countries. However, our review of the literature shows that there is 
a scarcity in empirical studies that have examined this relationship in the context of 
MENA region. Most of the previous studies that have used firm-level FDI on 
MENA region are country survey case studies that have looked similarly to the 
performance of firms in particular industry at particular year. The scarcity in 
empirical analysis studies on MENA countries at the microeconomic level is 
mainly attributed to the lack in the firm-level data available on these countries. In 
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recent years, more firm-level survey data have become available and, as 
consequence, researchers are more encouraged to make systematic use of different 
data sources. Atiyas (2011) summarises studies that use firm-level data in MENA 
countries to analyse productivity of firms and its relationship to market structure. 
He pointed out that there are an increasing number of studies that used firm-level 
data to assess the impacts of market structure and the business environment on firm 
performance (see Dethier et al. (2010) for a detailed survey). However, studies that 
have investigated these impacts in the context of MENA countries have not been 
carried out, (Atiyas 2011, p. 178).  
Using a unique firm-level data provided by the World Bank Enterprise Survey, the 
aim of this research is to investigate the effects of FDI and business environment 
conditions on the performance of firms in three selected MENA countries, namely 
Egypt, Morocco and Turkey, and two industries, textiles and garments. More 
specifically, the aim of these analyses is to answer the following questions: (1) 
What are the effect of FDI on performance of domestic firms? (2) Do foreign 
owned firms perform better than domestic owned firms? (3)Are there any 
differences in the performance of firms across countries and industries? (4) What 
are the effects of business environment constraints on the performance of firms? 
In order to answer the above questions, we use a comparable a panel firm-level data 
provided by the World Bank. Our work contributes to the existing literature by 
providing new evidence on the performance of firms in three MENA representative 
countries namely, Egypt, Morocco and Turkey in the industry of textiles and 
garment.  
 
 126 
 
7.2. Importance of Textiles and Garments in MENA  
Textiles and garments industry has been long tradition in MENA region and 
considered to be a major contributor to the income and employments of the 
resource-poor countries in the region. The contribution of textiles and garments 
production to GDP differs among MENA countries (see table 7.1), and it is up to 
3% in Egypt, 9.4% in Jordan, 5.1% in Morocco and 5.6% in Tunisia,( World Bank 
2006a).  In Syria, the textile and garment sector represent about 24% of non-oil 
industrial production and 45% of non-oil exports in 2004. The number of textile 
and garment companies in 2004 accounted for more than 20% of Syrian industrial 
firms, (UNIDO 2009).  Turkey is one of the world top textiles and garments 
producers (represent 3.7% of the world market share) and it is ranked among the 
most competitive countries such as China, India and South Korea (WTO 2010). In 
term of the employment, textiles and garments sector absorbs a large share of low-
skilled industrial labor and affects, directly and indirectly, the incomes of millions 
of people in the MENA region. In Egypt, the sector represents nearly 30% of the 
industrial labor force.  In Turkey the sector provides approximately 2 million jobs 
for workers. In Morocco and Tunisia, more than 200,000 workers depend on 
textiles and garments for their income and living, while in Jordan, the industry 
provides about 30,000 jobs in the country.  
The end of the Multi-fibre Arrangement on January 1, 2005, has significant 
deterring impacts on textiles and garments productions in MENA region. Most of 
MENA countries (except for Turkey) were not able to compete with the lower cost 
of other developing countries in Asia and Latin America and have lost their share in 
the world market. The effects were severing especially in Egypt as domestic firms’ 
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sales have dropped significantly (50% decline between the years 2000 and 2004) 
reflecting the fact that foreign competitors are driving Egyptian textiles and 
garments firms out of the domestic market, (El-Haddad 2012). 
Table 7.1. Contribution of textiles and garments in MENA economies (2005) 
Country Contribution to overall GDP (%) 
Contribution to industrial 
value added (%) 
Share of T&G in 
employment (%) 
Egypt 3 30 30 
Jordan 9.4 20 20 
Morocco 5.1 17 45 
Tunisia 5.6 42 44* 
Source: Adapted from the World Bank MENA report No. 35376. * Lahcen Achy(2011) 
 
 
7.3. Data and Variables 
In this study, we use a new available firm-level data provided by the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey to investigate the effects of FDI and business environment 
constraints on the performance of firms in three MENA representative countries, 
Egypt, Morocco and Turkey in the industries of textiles and garments. The total 
number of firms used in this study is 1557 textiles and garments firms surveyed 
over the period 2004-2008. Unfortunately, firm-level data on other important 
textiles and garments producer countries like Tunisia, Syria and Jordan are not 
available. Also, due to a lot of missing observations on some of the variables 
needed in our estimation, the total available number of firms is lower than the 
actual number in all the three countries. Table 7.2 present the description of the 
variables used in this study and their expected signs. 
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Table 7.2. Description of the variables and their expected signs 
Variable Discerption of the variables Expected Signs 
LN SPW The log of total sales of firm in US$ divided by the number of workers. Dependent .V 
LN CAPPW The log of total assets of firm in US$ divided by the number of workers. + 
FOREIGN The percentage of firms owned by foreign + 
DOMESTIC The percentage of firms owned by domestic - 
EDUCATION 
Inadequately educated workforce obstacle indicator 
encoded as 0: No obstacle; 1: Minor obstacle; 2: 
Moderate obstacle ;3: Major obstacle; 4: very 
severe obstacle 
_ 
FINANCE 
Access to finance obstacle indicator encoded as 0: 
No obstacle; 1: Minor obstacle; 2: Moderate 
obstacle ;3: Major obstacle; 4: very severe obstacle 
_ 
CORRUPTION 
Corruption obstacle indicator encoded as 0: No 
obstacle; 1: Minor obstacle; 2: Moderate obstacle 
;3: Major obstacle; 4: very severe obstacle 
_ 
COMPETITORS A dummy variable equal to one if a firm have more than 3 competitors or zero otherwise _ 
ELECTRICITY The average number of power outages per month _ 
REGULATIONS 
Factor analysis score on five government regulation 
obstacles, namely, labour regulations, customs and 
trade regulations, business licensing and operating 
permits, tax rates and tax administration obstacles. 
_ 
SMALL A dummy variable equal to one if the number of the workers in a firm is less than 20 or zero otherwise. + 
MEDIUM 
A dummy variable equal to one if the number of the 
workers in a firm is more than 20 and less than 100 
or zero otherwise. 
+ 
LARGE 
A dummy variable equal to one if the number of the 
workers in a firm is more than 100 or zero 
otherwise. 
+ 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
 
Table 7.3 present the data deceptive statistics of the variables for the full sample of 
firms in the three MENA countries. As can be seen from the table, the electricity 
outages indicator and the percentage of the foreign ownership are the variables with 
the highest mean and standard deviation among the variables. The average value for 
the electricity outages variable is 9.28 percent and its stander deviation is 35.34 
percent. Also, the average value for the percentage of foreign ownership is 6.93 
percent and its stander deviation is 23.96 percent.  
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Table 7.3. Data descriptive statistics 
VARIBLES Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
LN SPW 9.07 1.56 -5.74 20.34 1557 
LN CAPPW 8.17 1.76 -0.23 17.75 1557 
FOREIGN 6.93 23.96 0 100 1557 
DOMESTIC 1.40 11.60 0 100 1557 
EDUCATION 1.81 1.53 0 4 1557 
FINANCE 0.71 1.31 0 4 1557 
CORRUPTION 1.73 1.61 0 4 1557 
COMPETITORS 0.18 0.39 0 1 1557 
ELECTRICITY 9.28 35.34 0 777 1557 
REGULATIONS 0.06 0.91 -1.62 2.78 1557 
SMALL 0.26 0.44 0 1 1557 
MEDIUM 0.36 0.48 0 1 1557 
LARGE 0.38 0.49 0 1 1557 
 
Table 7.4 present the correlations and level of significance between the variables 
used in this study. The table show that our dependent variable (sales per workers) 
positively correlated with the variables of capital intensity, foreign ownership, and 
large size firm dummy and negatively to  the variables of domestic ownership, 
education of labor obstacle, finance obstacle, corruption obstacle, the number of 
competitors, electricity outages, government regulations, small size firm dummy and 
medium size firm dummy. 
 
Table 7.4. Correlation Matrix  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) 1             
(2) 0.44* 1            
(3) 0.04 -0.03 1           
(4) -0.10* -0.08* -0.03 1          
(5) -0.09* -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 1         
(6) -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.06* 0.10* 1        
(7) -0.08* 0.05* -0.10* -0.04 0.19* 0.15* 1       
(8) 0.21* 0.14* -0.10* -0.01 0.02 0.06* 0.10* 1      
(9) -0.09* 0.02 -0.06* -0.03 0.09* 0.02 0.07* 0.03 1     
(10) -0.05* -0.06* -0.01 -0.09* 0.30* 0.13* 0.27* -0.02 0.03 1    
(11) -0.15* -0.03 -0.12* -0.08* -0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.05* 0.09* -0.04 1   
(12) 0.10* 0.07* -0.04 -0.09* -0.05* -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.05* -0.45* 1  
(13) 0.03 -0.05 0.15* 0.16* 0.08* 0.04 -0.01 0.05* -0.06* -0.01 -0.47* -0.58* 1 
Note: * Indicate significant at 5% level of confidence. (1) LN SPW (2) LNCAPPW (3) FOREIGN (4) DOMESTIC 
(5) EDUCATION (6) FINANCE (7) CORRUPTION (8) COMPETITORS (9) ELECTRICITY (10) REGULATIONS (11) 
SMALL (12) MEDIUM (13) LARGE. 
 
 
 130 
 
7.4. World Bank Enterprise Survey  
The World Bank Enterprise Survey database considered as an important and rich 
source of firm-level data for researchers; it has a wider scope of topics and 
information about various issues related to the productivity of firms overall the 
world. The data cover more than 130,000 firms across more than 120 countries. 
One of the many advantages of using this survey is that the questions are identical 
through firms across all countries. The standard enterprise survey questionnaire 
includes questions about firm characteristics, gender participation, access to 
finance, annual sales, costs of inputs/labour, workforce composition, bribery, 
licensing, infrastructure, trade, crime, competition, capacity utilisation, land and 
permits, taxation, informality, business-government relations, innovation and 
technology, and performance measures. Over 90% of the questions objectively 
ascertain characteristics of a country’s business environment. The remaining 
questions assess the survey respondents’ opinions on the obstacles (0: No obstacle; 
1: Minor obstacle; 2: Moderate obstacle, 3: Major obstacle; 4: very severe obstacle) 
to firm growth and performance. The mode of data collection is face-to-face 
interviews. 
 
7.5. Specification of the Model 
In order to investigate empirically the impacts of the FDI and the business 
environment constraints on performance of firms in the three selected MENA 
countries, we use a panel OLS regression model. The specification of the panel 
OLS regression used in this study outlined as follows: 
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𝐿𝑁 𝑆𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽5𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽8𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽12𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
Where: 
𝐿𝑁 𝑆𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑡  is the log of total sales in US$ divided by the number of workers. 
𝐿𝑁 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑡   is the log of total assets in US$ divided by the number of workers.  
𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑖𝑡  is the percentage of firms owned by foreign. 
𝐷𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡  is the percentage of firms owned by domestic. 
𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡  is the labour education obstacle. 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡  is the access to finance obstacle.  
𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡  is the corruption obstacle.   
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡   is a dummy variable for the number of competitors.  
𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡  is the electricity outages obstacle.  
𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the factor analysis of the government regulations obstacle.  
𝑆𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡  is a dummy variable for small firms (20 workers or less). 
𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡  is a dummy variable for small firms (more than 20 and less than 100). 
𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  is a dummy variable for large firms (100 workers or more). 
𝜖𝑡  is the error term. 
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7.6. Empirical Results 
 
Table 7.5 presents the panel OLS regression results for textiles and garments firms 
in the three selected MENA countries Egypt, Morocco and Turkey over the period 
2004-2008. The use of panel data in qualitative studies has an important advantage 
that we are able to track the performance of same firm over time and control for the 
firm-level effects such as change in the ownership and quality of firms (see Aitken 
and Harrison 1999). As start in our empirical analysis, we estimate a pooled OLS 
regression for the full sample of firms in the three MENA countries (baseline 
specification) to see what factors can explain the performance of firms in the three 
selected countries. Column 1 present the regression results of the baseline 
specification. Accordingly, the estimated coefficient on the ratio of foreign 
ownership found to be positive and statistically significant indicates that the 
increase in the foreign ownership indeed increase the productivity per work of 
domestic firms. In contact, the estimated coefficient on the ratio of domestic 
ownership found to be negative and statistically significant indicating that the 
increase in the domestic ownership worsens the productivity per worker of firms. 
Our result in this regard is in line with the previous studies that confirmed the 
superiority of foreign firms in their performance over the domestic firms in the 
local market.  
 The results also indicate that the performance of firms hindered by the constraints 
of business environment in the three MENA selected countries. The estimated 
coefficients on education of labor, access to finance, corruption and electricity 
outages obstacles were all found to be negatively associated with the performance 
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of firms in these countries. The estimated coefficients on the firm size dummies 
indicate that medium size firms tend to be in general more productive than small 
size firms.   The estimated coefficient on the competition found to be positive and 
statistically significant. This may come across as an unexpected result. As 
suggested in the literature of market structure and performance of firms, the 
increase in the number of competitors in an industry is likely to increase the 
competition level and, as a result, it is expected to have an adverse negative effect 
on the performance of firms. However, in the context of MENA countries where 
there are many state owned firms that have been recently privatised, the change in 
the control over firms form domestic to foreign is expected to added to the overall 
productivity of the firms.  Ben Naceur etal. (2007) assesses the performance of 
newly privatised firms in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and turkey and found that that 
these firms experience significant increase in profitability and operating efficiency. 
To test for the hypothesis of whether the performance of firms differs across the 
two industries, we estimate a dummy for industry (textiles dummy equal one if a 
firm is operating in textiles industry or zero otherwise). The coefficient on the 
industry dummy measures the difference in the performance of firms between the 
three selected MENA countries, assuming that these countries have the same levels 
of all the variables. The results reported in column 2 indicate that the coefficient on 
textiles dummy is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that, if all the 
values of the variables were the same for the three countries, textiles firms are more 
productive per worker than garments firms in the three MENA countries. After, we 
test for the hypothesis of whether the performance of firms differs across countries 
in each industry. In order to this, we estimate separate regressions by industry and 
test for the performance of firms by country using dummies. The results reported in 
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columns 3, 4 and 5 are the regression results estimated for textiles firms only, while 
the regression result reported in columns 6, 7 and 8 are the regression results 
estimated for garments firms only.  
The results produced for textiles and garments firms indicate that there are 
significant differences in the performance of firms in the three MENA countries 
across the two industries. The coefficient on Egypt dummy found to be negative 
and statistically significant whiles the coefficients on Morocco and Turkey’ 
dummies found to be positive and statistically significant in both industries. This 
suggests that textiles and garments firms in Egypt preform efficiently less 
compared to the performance of textiles and garments firms in Morocco and 
Turkey. Furthermore, the results indicate that the magnitudes of these effects differ 
between countries and industries. For instance, the magnitude of the coefficient 
estimated for textiles firms in Turkey shows to have higher impact compared to the 
coefficient estimated for textiles firms in Morocco. This suggests that textiles firms 
in Turkey preform efficiently higher than textiles firms in Morocco. In contrast, the 
magnitude of the coefficient estimated for garments firms in Morocco shows to 
have higher impact compared to the impact of the coefficient estimated for 
garments firms in Turkey. This also suggests that garments firms in Morocco 
preform efficiently higher than garments firms in Turkey.  
 The results also show that our variables affect the performance of firms differently 
across countries and industries. The results suggest that there are heterogeneity in 
the performance of firms in turkey and performance of firms in Egypt and 
Morocco.  This difference in the behaviour of firms is notable especially when we 
estimate separate regression for each industry and control for the effects of each 
country using a country dummy. For instance, in column 5, the introduction of 
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Turkey dummy to the regression indicate that the presence of foreign ownership is 
highly important for the performance of textiles firms in Egypt and Morocco but 
not for textiles firms in Turkey. Also, in column 8, the introduction of Turkey 
dummy to the regression indicate that access to finance is severe obstacle for the 
performance of garments firms in Egypt and Morocco but not for garments firms in 
Turkey. Likewise, in columns 5 and 8 the effect of corruption shows to be highly 
significant for the performance of firms in Egypt and Morocco but not for the 
performance of firms in Turkey. Another important observation also is the effect of 
competition on the performance of textiles firms in Egypt and Morocco which 
appear to be negative but statistically insignificant after the inclusion of Turkey 
dummy to the regression reported in column 5. 
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Table 7.5. Panel OLS regression results for Egypt, Morocco and Turkey 2004-2008 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CONSTANT 6.220*** 
(29.97) 
6.163*** 
(28.92) 
6.492*** 
(24.89) 
5.552*** 
(17.12) 
6.965*** 
(23.61) 
7.298*** 
(25.49) 
5.387*** 
(16.84) 
6.308*** 
(19.49) 
LN CAPINTNT 0.374*** 
(15.63) 
0.371*** 
(15.61) 
0.367*** 
(12.19) 
0.386*** 
(11.25) 
0.253*** 
(7.23) 
0.313*** 
(10.64) 
0.381*** 
(11.38) 
0.361*** 
(10.75) 
FOREIGN 0.003*** 
(3.74) 
0.003*** 
(3.73) 
0.001 
(1.20) 
0.000 
(0.23) 
0.002** 
(2.55) 
0.002* 
(1.86) 
0.004** 
(2.32) 
0.008*** 
(3.97) 
DOMESTIC -0.008*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.009*** 
(-3.05) 
-0.003 
(-1.20) 
-0.007** 
(-2.32) 
-0.007*** 
(0.008) 
-0.006* 
(-1.66) 
-0.006 
(-1.28) 
-0.006 
(-0.78) 
EDUCATION -0.062*** 
(-2.71) 
-0.060*** 
(-2.63) 
0.003 
(0.13) 
-0.019 
(-0.68) 
-0.043** 
(-1.63) 
0.039 
(1.24) 
-0.008 
(-0.23) 
-0.055** 
(-1.53) 
FINANCE -0.037 
(-1.34) 
-0.03 
(-1.33) 
-0.095 
(-1.82) 
-0.071 
(-1.89) 
-0.026 
(-0.81) 
-0.017 
(-0.45) 
-0.033 
(-0.76) 
-0.115*** 
(-2.85) 
CORRUPTION -0.095*** 
(-4.27) 
-0.093*** 
(-4.21) 
0.008 
(0.31) 
-0.048* 
(-1.72) 
-0.078*** 
(-2.93) 
0.045 
(1.56) 
0.048 
(1.39) 
-0.105*** 
(-3.17) 
COMPETITORS 0.550*** 
(5.08) 
0.553*** 
(5.10) 
0.331*** 
(2.85) 
0.568*** 
(4.29) 
-0.137 
(-1.06) 
0.522*** 
(3.41) 
0.992*** 
(5.16) 
0.280 
(1.57) 
ELECTRICITY -0.002** 
(-2.60) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.63) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
-0.001 
(-1.52) 
-0.001 
(-1.20) 
-0.001 
(-0.84) 
-0.004** 
(-2.19) 
-0.006*** 
(-3.10) 
REGULATIONS 0.047 
(1.24) 
0.047 
(1.23) 
-0.038 
(-0.84) 
-0.010 
(-0.21) 
0.108** 
(2.36) 
-0.084 
(-1.56) 
-0.103* 
(-1.75) 
0.073 
(1.19) 
SMALL SIZE -0.301*** 
(-3.33) 
-0.280*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.074* 
(-1.62) 
-0.074* 
(-1.60) 
-0.041* 
(-1.35) 
-3.317** 
(-2.43) 
-0.388*** 
(-2.64) 
-0.451*** 
(-3.21) 
MEDIUM SIZE 0.071 
(0.89) 
0.086 
(1.05) 
0.023 
(0.19) 
0.177 
(1.38) 
0.147 
(1.19) 
1.114 
(0.93) 
0.093 
(0.67) 
0.031 
(0.23) 
TEXTILES DUMMY  0.087** 
(1.23) 
      
EGYPT DUMMY   -1.142*** 
(-12.08) 
  -1.733*** 
(-15.28) 
  
MOROCCO DUMMY    0.605*** 
(4.81) 
  1.255*** 
(10.21) 
 
TURKEY DUMMY     1.804*** 
(13.15) 
  1.645*** 
(7.59) 
ADJ R-SQUARE 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.32 0.39 0.55 0.43 0.42 
NORMALITY TEST P-
VALUE 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
HETEROSKEDASTICITY 
TEST P-VALUE 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.48 0.84 0.42 
F-STATISTIC 47.04 43.35 37.27 22.17 67.78 75.16 53.96 39.89 
VIF MEAN VALUE 1.13 1.13 1.28 1.34 1.28 1.25 1.26 1.23 
NUMBER OFF 
OBSERVATIONS 
1557 1557 997 997 997 560 560 560 
Note: *,**,*** indicate significant at 1%,5% and 10% respectively. T-statistics reported in parentheses. 
Shapiro–Wilk normality test used to detect for the normality of the residuals. Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg test used to detect for heteroskedasticity. Variance inflation factor (VIF) indicator used to 
detect for multicollinearity. 
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7.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter investigates empirically the effects of FDI and business environment 
constraints on the performance of firms in three MENA countries, Egypt, Morocco 
and Turkey over the period 2004-2008. The results from the pooled OLS regression 
estimated across countries and industries indicate that foreign ownership tends to 
increase the productivity per worker of firms while the case is the opposite for 
domestic firms. The results also show that performance of firms is hindered by the 
constraints of business environments in the three MENA countries. The effect of 
education of labor, access to finance, corruption and electricity outages obstacles 
were all found to be negatively associated with the growth and performance of 
firms. The results also show that there are significant differences in the 
performance of firms across countries and industries. A dummy variable encoded 
for industry indicates that textiles firms generally perform better than garments 
firms in the three MENA countries. Our comparison about the performance of firms 
in the three countries indicates that textiles and garments firms perform the best in 
Turkey and Morocco and the worst in Egypt. A dummy variable encoded for 
country indicated that firms in Egypt have less advantage in their productivity per 
worker than firms in Turkey and Morocco. The effects of foreign ownership, 
corruption, labour education, access to finance found to be more important for the 
performance of firms in Egypt and Morocco than the performance of firms in 
Turkey. The implication for policy makers in Egypt and Morocco following these 
results is that an increase in the foreign participation in firm and the improvement 
in the overall business environment condition of firms in Egypt and Morocco can 
result in optimal level and productivity of firms equal to that in Turkey. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
8.1. Summary of the Empirical Findings 
This chapter outlines the main findings and contributions of this thesis and offers 
some policy implications and suggestions for further researches. The empirical 
work of this thesis consists of three main chapters. In chapter five, we investigate 
the determinants of FDI within the MENA region using a gravity model. FDI 
between MENA countries represents a high share of the total FDI to the region (a 
third of the total FDI to the MENA region is intraregional) and, therefore, one of 
the aims of this thesis was to examine the economic and institutional determinant 
factors of these flows. The empirical analysis of this research was conducted using 
a gravity model, with time and country fixed effects included in the model. The use 
of the gravity model for this study in particular was to access the importance of 
geographical and culture effects on the flow of FDI within the region. The 
specification of the gravity model was estimated using two estimation methods, the 
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Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and the binary choice probit (PROBIT) estimator as 
an alternative method of dealing with zeroes presence in the dataset. The 
appropriateness of the estimated models has been tested using the Ramsey RESET 
misspecification test. The results from the model selection test indicate that 
PROBIT estimations are appropriate for modelling the relationship between Intra-
MENA FDI and its explanatory variables in the context of the gravity model. In 
order to control for the heterogeneity between countries, as well as to assess for the 
effects of time invariant variables such as distance and common borders, we use a 
time and countries dummy variable as a way of implementing fixed effects. Also, 
because our sample of MENA region comprises a set of countries that are 
economically diversified, we expect the factors that determine FDI flow to 
resource-rich countries to be different than resource-poor countries in the region. 
Therefore, the suggestion (as indicated by Chow test) was to perform separate 
regressions for each set of countries. The results from the gravity model estimated 
for the full sample of MENA countries confirm our predictions of the importance of 
geographical and culture factors as determinants of FDI between MENA countries. 
FDI within MENA countries was found to be positively driven by the economic 
size of both sending and receiving countries and negatively by the physical distance 
between them. The results also indicate that traditional gravity factors play 
important roles in promoting the level of FDI between MENA countries. The 
effects of common borders and bilateral investment treaties are particularly relevant 
to FDI within the region, suggesting that bilateral FDI flows are tend to be larger 
between neighbours, having already well-established investment treaties 
agreements. The results from this chapter also show that resource-rich countries 
receive less FDI compared to resource-poor countries in the region. The results also 
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show that institutions effect FDI to MENA countries differently. Accordingly, the 
effect of quality of institutions on FDI to resource-rich country found to be negative 
while its effect found to be positive on FDI to resource-poor countries. 
In the second chapter, we investigate the determinants of FDI to MENA countries 
in comparison to developing countries. FDI to MENA countries has rapidly 
increased in the last two decades but not as much as in developing countries. The 
question that has been investigated in the relevant literature is whether the 
determinants of FDI to developing countries affect MENA countries differently. 
Our work is different than the previous work of Onyeiwu (2003) and Sufian and 
Sidiropoulos (2010) in two respects. First, we include mostly MENA natural 
resource countries in our sample and investigate in particular for the effect of 
natural resources on FDI. Second, we include the institutional element in our 
analysis using  composite institutional index that reflect several characteristics of a 
country’s overall quality of institutions, such as the voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, regularity quality, rule of law and level of corruption. 
The results indicate that if all the values of the explanatory variables were the same 
for all developing countries, a MENA country will receive about 1.21 percent less 
FDI than a non-MENA country. The results also indicate that a MENA country 
receives even less FDI when other relevant economic variables such as the 
availability of natural resource and the level of macroeconomic instability added to 
the model. This finding suggests that the availability of natural resource in MENA 
region has worsened its chance to receive more FDI as much as developing 
countries. The results indicate that except for trade and institutions, all the 
interactive terms of the MENA dummy with the explanatory variables are 
negatively associated with FDI. This indicates clearly that MENA countries on 
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average have less advantage in attracting more FDI in comparison to developing 
countries. Our results in this regard suggest that the effect of quality of institutions 
on FDI to MENA countries is positive, while the interaction between natural 
resource and institutions on FDI is negative. This finding is different for developing 
countries in our sample in which the interaction of natural resource and institutions 
found to be positive. 
In chapter seven, we investigate the effects of FDI and business environment 
conditions on the performance of firms in three MENA countries, Egypt, Morocco 
and Turkey and two manufacturing industries, textiles and garments over the period 
2004-2008. The results indicate that foreign ownership found to have positive 
significant impact on the performance of firms while domestic ownership found to 
have negative significant impact on the performance of firms in the three MENA 
countries. The results also show that performance of textiles and garments firms are 
hindered by the constraints of business environments in the three MENA countries. 
The effect of education of labor, access to finance, corruption and electricity 
outages obstacles were all found to be particular important for growth and 
performance of firms. Our comparison about the performance of firms in the three 
countries indicates that textiles and garments firms perform the best in Turkey and 
Morocco and the worst in Egypt. A dummy variable encoded for country indicated 
that firms in Egypt have less advantage in their productivity per worker than firms 
in Turkey and Morocco. The implication for policy makers in Egypt and Morocco 
following these results is that an increase in the foreign participation in firm and the 
improvement in the overall business environment condition of firms in Egypt and 
Morocco can result in optimal level and productivity of firms equal to that in 
Turkey 
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8.2. Research Contribution 
This thesis is believed to contribute to the literature of FDI determinants in several 
ways. First, our research is the first in its kind to investigate FDI into MENA 
countries with especial emphasis on the roles played by the natural resource and 
institutions on FDI to the region. Most previous studies (reviewed in chapter three) 
concern FDI determinants in MENA have based their results on  selective samples 
which are often do not include all MENA countries as one block of countries. Also, 
none of these studies take into account the difference in the economic and 
institutional structure of resource-rich and resource poor economies in MENA 
region. For instance, in chapter five, we use a gravity model to investigate the 
determinants of bilateral FDI between MENA countries and assess for the impact of 
resource-rich countries in the region using a dummy variable. Also, we extent our 
analysis and estimate separate regressions for each group of countries. The results 
from the gravity model estimated for the full sample of MENA countries indicate 
the disadvantage of resource-rich countries in receiving more FDI compared to 
resource-poor countries. Furthermore, the results from the gravity model estimated 
for each group of resource-rich and resource-poor countries indicate that 
institutions have positive impact on FDI to resource-poor countries only, but not for 
resource-rich countries.  
Likewise, in chapter six, the only study conducted by Onyeiwu (2004) which 
investigate FDI determinants in MENA countries in comparison to developing 
countries, used a sample of 51 developing countries in which 10 of them located in 
MENA region, (Algeria and Iran the only resource-rich countries among the 10 
MENA countries). Unlike Onyeiwu’ (2004) study, our study include a wide set of 
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75 developing countries (15 of them located in MENA region) for which data are 
available from 1996-2011 using a set of economic and institutional variables. Our 
study also differs than Onyeiwu’ (2004) study by adding the institutional element to 
the analysis using a composite index of the six World Bank Governance Indicators. 
Our results indicate that natural resources and its interaction with institutions in 
MENA countries have an adverse effect on FDI even after controlling for the 
necessary factors for FDI. 
In chapter seven, Our research contribute to the limited empirical literature on firms 
performance and growth in the MENA region by attempting to assess the impact of 
FDI and various constraints faced by local firms using firm-level data provided by 
the World Bank Business Enterprise surveys. To the best of our knowledge, this 
dataset has not been used in any empirical analysis looking at the main constraints 
on growth in the MENA region (see Atyias 2011). The empirical results from this 
chapter indicate that foreign firms tend to perform better than domestic firms across 
countries and industries. Textiles and garments firms in Egypt found to have less 
advantage in their productivity per worker than firms in Turkey and Morocco.  
 
8.3. Research Policy Implications 
Following the empirical findings of this thesis, we suggest some of the important 
policy implications for policy makers in the MENA region for FDI attraction.  The 
results from chapter five suggest that geographical factors such as physical 
distance, common borders play an important role in explaining the flow of FDI 
between MENA countries. MENA countries can increase the level of FDI within 
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the region by implementing more policies and investment agreements, such as 
bilateral investment treaties that aim to protect private investment and facilitate 
businesses between countries. Our results in this regard show that bilateral 
investment treaties between MENA countries are highly important and have direct 
significant impact on the flow of FDI within the region. The policy implication 
following these findings is that MENA countries can eliminate their structural 
differences by investing more within their region. Many of the resource-rich labour-
exporting countries such as GCC countries have the potential for providing capital 
and creating businesses, investing locally, and can be of great benefit for other 
resource-poor labour-abundant countries in the region, especially those suffering 
from a higher level of unemployment and a shortage of financial sources. Also, in 
order for MENA countries to promote their level of intraregional FDI, there is the 
need for more effective institutional reform and policies that aim to remove 
restrictions and economic barriers faced by local investors. Such efforts will make 
the region more economically integrated and can benefit both foreign and local 
investors.  
The results from chapter six suggest that MENA countries should diversify their 
economic structures and move away from their high dependency on the natural 
resource revenue that harms their economies and makes them to be vulnerable to oil 
price market shocks. In the literature, it has been well-documented that a higher 
dependency on oil revenues leads to higher government spending, real exchange 
rate appreciation and a loss of competitiveness in the non-oil tradable sector (e.g. 
Everhart and Duval-Hernández 2001). MENA countries are not exempt from this 
case. FDI inflows in oil and gas-related sectors can only limit their chances of 
receiving more FDI in the manufacturing sectors, in which transfer to technology, 
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knowledge, skills of labour and jobs creation are more beneficial for the 
development and welfare of the country. By diversifying their economies, MENA 
countries will be able to resolve their economic problems, such as the high level of 
unemployment, upgrade their quality of infrastructure and improve their financial 
services.  The results suggest that the quality of institutions in the MENA region is 
one of the most important factors for attracting FDI. A fragile institutions 
framework increases the cost of doing business and limits the attractiveness of 
MENA as a place to invest. MENA countries can reach an optimal level in FDI 
inflows as much as in developing countries by improving their quality of 
institutions. Reducing the level of corruption, protecting property rights, increasing 
government effectiveness and implementing policies and regulations that promote 
investment are all equally important for foreign investors.  
The results in chapter seven suggest that foreign ownership is associated more with 
improvements in the productivity of firms in three selected countries (Egypt, 
Morocco and Turkey), while domestic ownership was found to have a deterring 
impact on the performance of firms and industry in general. Following this finding, 
the policy implication for policy makers in MENA countries is to remove 
restrictions on foreign firms’ entry and ownership and pursue a policy for 
privatising state and domestic-owned enterprises. Privatisation in the MENA region 
has progressed at a slower pace than in other developing countries, such as Asian 
and Latin America. Particularly in Egypt, most of the firms operating in the textile 
and garment industry are still state-owned and their performance is not as superior 
as that of foreign firms.   
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8.4. Research Limitations  
One of the biggest obstacles for empirical researches and studies on the MENA 
region is the lack of sufficient data available on these countries. Our desire to 
include as many countries as possible in order to provide a complete MENA picture 
conflicts with the scarcity of data in some of the countries considered. 
Unfortunately, most of the data available on MENA countries are not 
comprehensive enough to include many variables in our models. Some of the 
important factors, which have been found to be important determinants of FDI in 
other empirical studies for developing countries, were not included in this research 
because of data constraints. For instance, data on human capital, technology, tariff 
rates and political risk in MENA countries is very scant. Assessing the effect of 
these variables on FDI inflows to MENA countries is essential, as evidences about 
their effects on FDI to developing countries were often found to be significant.  
Also, one of the important issues that have often been faced by many researchers is 
the problem of multicollinearity between variables. Our interest to include many 
FDI determinant variables was often challenged by the problem of multicollinearity 
that often misleadingly inflates the standard errors. Thus, it makes some of our 
variables statistically insignificant while they should be otherwise significant. 
Decomposing the model to more than one is sometimes not informative enough as 
it does not provide a single model with all the important determinants of FDI.  
 
 
 
 147 
 
8.5. Further Area of Research 
Empirical studies on the determinants of FDI in the MENA region are generally 
limited. As mentioned in the previous section, the lack of data available on MENA 
countries in particular has limited the number of studies on the region considerably. 
However, in recent years, data have come to be available for researchers and there 
are different sources emerging that provide data at different levels. With these 
available sources of data, there is a need for further research, especially at firm-
level FDI. The WBES data is potentially an important and rich source of firm-level 
data. Although this research has used WBES firm-level data to answer some of the 
questions related to the difference in productivity of foreign and domestic firms, 
there are still many other questions that have not yet been covered.  Atiyas (2011) 
provides some research questions that would be fruitful for researchers in the 
MENA region to address in the context of productivity of firms and also what sort 
of data that can be used to address them. Accordingly, there are very limited 
researches on the role of information technology and financial constraints in the 
productivity of firms. Given the availability of recent WBES data, these areas are 
likely to be rewarding areas of research. 
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